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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
The Knowledge of Others’ Perceptions (KOP) Model: Practical Accuracy Among the
Well-Acquainted
by
Brittany Charlotte Solomon
Doctor of Philosophy in Psychology
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Professor Joshua Jackson, Chair
Simine Vazire, Co-Chair
It is possible that people, especially those who are well-acquainted, have information about
others that goes beyond their own impressions. While previous studies primarily focus on the
accuracy of a perceiver’s own impressions of a target, they may miss information about the perceiver’s
knowledge of a target’s identity and reputation. The present study is based on the notion that there
may be more to knowing a person than having an accurate perception of his/her personality in the
traditional sense. From a practical standpoint, it might also be important to know when others’
impressions of a close other, such as a friend or co-worker, differ from one’s own impressions and
to understand the nature of such perceptual discrepancies.
In the current study, two constructs that reflect a relatively novel type of other-knowledge were
investigated: knowledge of identity and knowledge of reputation. Specifically, the knowledge of
others’ perceptions (KOP) model is introduced and used to examine the extent to which well-acquainted
friends achieve such knowledge. First, identity accuracy and reputation accuracy were examined
(i.e., accurate perceptions of a target’s self-views and of how others view the target, respectively).
Second, identity insight and reputation insight were examined (i.e., accurate perceptions of a
target’s self-views and of how others view the target, above and beyond a perceiver’s own impressions
of the target). Finally, characteristics of the target, perceiver, and dyad were tested as potential
moderators to shed light on the circumstances under which knowledge of identity and reputation
are likely to occur.
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“Tact is the ability to describe others as they see themselves.”
—Abraham Lincoln
“Whether true or false, what is said about men often has as much influence on their lives, and particularly
on their destinies, as what they do.”
—Victor Hugo, Les Misérables

It is possible that people, especially those who are well-acquainted, have information about
others that goes beyond their own impressions. That is, they may have insight into another person’s
identity and reputation (see, e.g., Solomon & Vazire, 2014). A great deal of research has focused on
the accuracy of interpersonal perceptions of personality based on the extent to which a perceiver
knows a target individual’s actual standing on a given trait (e.g., Funder & West, 1993; John &
Robins, 1993; Vazire, 2010; Watson, Hubbard, & Wiese, 2000) and the extent to which a perceiver
knows the patterning and ordering of a target’s holistic personality across a set of traits (e.g.,
Biesanz, 2010; Chan, Rogers, Parisotto, & Biesanz, 2011; Furr, 2008). While such previous studies
have focused on the accuracy of the perceiver’s own impressions, they may miss information about
the perceiver’s knowledge of a target’s identity and reputation, yielding a potentially incomplete
picture of how accurate people are about others’ personalities (i.e., other-knowledge). The present
study is based on the notion that there may be more to knowing a person than having an accurate
perception of his or her personality in the traditional sense. From a practical standpoint, it might
also be important to know when others’ impressions of a close other, such as a friend, co-worker,
or roommate, differ from one’s own impressions, and more importantly, to understand the nature
of such perceptual discrepancies; that is, how they are different.
The focus of this research is to shed light on whether people have accurate perceptions of how
close others see themselves and how those close others are seen by their friends. More specifically,
I investigated two constructs that reflect a relatively novel type of other-knowledge: knowledge
of identity and knowledge of reputation. I introduce the knowledge of others’ perceptions (KOP)
model, which I used to examine the extent to which well-acquainted friends have such knowledge.
First, I examined whether people can accurately infer others’ perceptions by assessing identity
accuracy and reputation accuracy (i.e., accurate perceptions of a target’s self-views and of how
1

others view the target, respectively). Second, I examined whether people can make the distinction
between their own perceptions of a target and others’ perceptions by assessing identity insight and
reputation insight (i.e., accurate perceptions of a target’s self-views and of how others view the
target, above and beyond a perceiver’s own impressions of the target). Finally, I also examined
whether characteristics of the target, perceiver, and dyad moderate the circumstances under which
knowledge of identity and reputation are likely to occur.
Examining whether people achieve this type of knowledge and when they are more likely to do
so may provide novel information about the extent to which people maintain their own perceptions
of others despite awareness of conflicting views. More broadly, this research may shed light on the
person perception process in terms of what contributes to accurate perceptions of well-acquainted
others. If accuracy “concerns the connections between our perceptions of reality and reality itself”
(Funder & West, 1993, p. 459), then knowledge of a target’s identity and reputation should serve
as one way for this connection to occur. People are rarely provided with feedback about the
accuracy of their interpersonal judgments, but having such knowledge of others’ perceptions would
compliment perceivers’ own impressions and provide a basis for gauging how accurate (or biased)
their judgments of others are. Presumably, having knowledge of others’ perceptions, regardless of
who is right or wrong, will provide individuals with a deeper understanding of the people in their
everyday lives and should be associated with greater success in achieving social goals.
Models of Other-Knowledge
Someone who forms accurate perceptions of others knows what other people are like in reality
(i.e., s/he has a high level of other-knowledge). Researchers have developed various models to
explain how people form accurate personality judgments and provide frameworks for examining
the conditions under which perceptions of others are most likely to be accurate. Based on a
nomothetic level approach (i.e., a trait-based approach used to assess between-person individual
differences one trait at a time), Funder’s (1995) realistic accuracy model (RAM) organizes the
process of forming an accurate perception of a given trait into four steps (relevance, availability,
detection, and utilization). Each step must exist without error for “achievement” (i.e., accurate

2

judgment of personality) to occur. Also, each step can be enhanced under certain conditions,
ultimately leading to a greater likelihood of accuracy (e.g., Blackman & Funder, 1998; Colvin,
1993; Funder & Dobroth, 1987; Funder & Colvin, 1988; Human & Biesanz, 2011a, 2011b;
John & Robins, 1993; Letzring, 2008; Letzring, Wells, & Funder, 2006). Similarly, Kenny’s
(2004) model of interpersonal perception called PERSON (personality, error, residual, stereotype,
opinion, and norm), which built off his Weighted-Average Model (WAM; Kenny, 1991), partitions
each perceiver’s judgment of a target’s personality into six sources of variance that can then be
used to explain factors that influence accuracy (e.g., Leising, Gallrein, & Dufner, 2014; Letzring
et al., 2006). In contrast, other researchers take an idiographic level (i.e., profile-based) approach,
emphasizing that knowing a person requires more than achieving accuracy for individual traits
at the absolute level. For instance, following Furr’s (2008) person-centered approach, Biesanz’s
(2010) social accuracy model (SAM) utilizes personality profiles to examine perceivers’ knowledge
of the within-person patterning of a set of individual differences, and also measures the effects of
target and perceiver characteristics on accuracy.
Altogether, these models provide a strong foundation for examining other-knowledge in the
traditional sense and indicate that the accuracy of interpersonal perceptions depends on a variety
of factors associated with the target, perceiver, and situation. However, the traditional accuracy
framework solely focuses on perceivers’ own interpersonal judgments – the extent to which other-perceptions
are accurate or biased. Having accurate perceptions of others is unquestionably important; yet, in
a practical sense, it may be just as important for people to have accurate perceptions of others’
subjective realities. Consider an employer who knows her employee’s standing on a variety of
personality traits at the absolute level. She is likely to accurately predict how satisfied he is at
work and how well he will get along with his co-workers (Judge, Heller, & Mount, 2002; Mount,
Barrick, & Stewart, 1998). However, the employer who knows how this employee sees himself
and how his co-workers see him will most likely make management decisions that motivate the
employee and facilitate a more harmonious work environment, regardless of whose perceptions
are right or wrong in the traditional sense. This example demonstrates how other-knowledge can
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include awareness of others’ perceptions and that this type of knowledge can connect people to
their social world and improve social transactions.
For the current study, I adapted the traditional accuracy framework to develop the KOP model
for examining what perceivers know about a target that goes beyond their own perceptions of
him/her. As previously mentioned, I focused on knowledge of a close friend’s identity and reputation,
as well as potential moderators of this type of other-knowledge.
Knowledge of Others’ Perceptions: Practical Accuracy Among the Well-Acquainted
In contrast to the more traditional approach used to study other-knowledge, I took a pragmatic
approach specifically to examine the notion that people have knowledge of others’ perceptions
of a well-acquainted target. This approach is based on the idea that the purpose of ascertaining
knowledge is to use it and that achieving goals in different contexts will require different types
of knowledge (Swann, 1984). Knowledge of others’ perceptions of close others reflects several
underpinnings of the pragmatic approach: (1) that it is important to understand the person perception
process in naturally occurring contexts in daily life and (2) that accurate interpersonal judgments
promote the social goals of the perceiver. Building off the idea that accuracy in the traditional
sense is not the only path toward successful social interactions, knowledge of others’ perceptions is
theoretically important because such awareness of others’ subjective realities may also be associated
with positive interpersonal outcomes. More specifically, acquiring knowledge of a target’s self-views
(identity) and knowledge of others’ views of that same target (reputation) are two potential ways
through which people can reach their interpersonal goals, regardless of whether their own perceptions
of a target are accurate or shared by others.
Discrepant perceptions. Based on the person perception literature, it is evident that perceivers
tend to agree moderately with targets and other perceivers about a target’s personality (for recent
reviews, see Connolly, Kavanagh, & Viswesvaran, 2007; Kenny & West, 2010; Vazire & Carlson,
2010). On the one hand, this is thought to be relatively impressive, especially in the context of
expected effect sizes. On the other hand, this same research simultaneously demonstrates that,
despite such agreement, people still have discrepant perceptions of personality.
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According to Vazire & Solomon’s (2014) fourth “principle” of interpersonal perception, motives
influence how we see others, and thus it should be unsurprising that people have discrepant perceptions
(some accurate, some biased). Vazire’s self-other knowledge asymmetry (SOKA; 2010) model
outlines the aspects of personality that others (or perceivers) should be able to see especially
clearly compared to the self (or target). Findings from a variety of studies have demonstrated that,
as predicted by the SOKA model, asymmetries in self- and other-knowledge are quite prevalent
(e.g., Carlson, Vazire, & Oltmanns, 2013; Fiedler, Oltmanns, & Turkheimer, 2004; John & Robins,
1993; Kolar, Funder, & Colvin, 1996; Smith et al., 2008; Spain, Eaton, & Funder, 2000; Vazire
& Mehl, 2008). To highlight this point, even when examining self-other agreement (i.e., the
extent to which other-perceptions of targets agree with targets’ self-perceptions) for non-evaluative
traits, correlations typically do not exceed about .60 with an average correlation ranging from
.30 to .40 (e.g., McCrae et al., 2004; Watson et al., 2000). The magnitude of these effects is
especially noteworthy given that self-other agreement on these types of traits (e.g., the Big Five
personality traits) tends to be higher than it is for other individual differences (e.g., Carlson, Vazire,
& Furr, 2011; John & Robins, 1993; Watson et al., 2000). Similarly, findings from profile-based
approaches also indicate that self-other agreement exists at only small to moderate levels (e.g.,
Biesanz & West, 2000; Blackman & Funder, 1998; McCrae, 1993, 2008).
In addition to discrepancies among self- and other-perceptions, discrepancies also exist across
perceivers, as even multiple other-perceptions of the same target can be idiosyncratic and disagree.
For instance, perceiver effects indicate that perceivers tend to judge others in particular ways
(Biesanz, 2010; Kenny, 1994), manifested and differentiated partially by the degree of positivity
in their ratings (Wood, Harms, & Vazire, 2010). Other research has shown that perceiver effects
are also multidimensional such that the effects for different traits are distinguishable from each
other (Srivastava, Guglielmo, & Beer, 2010). As such, it is unsurprising that consensus among
others is constrained (Biesanz & West, 2000; John & Robins, 1993; Kenny, 2004), and indeed,
based on evidence across 32 studies, consensus correlations tend to range from zero to .30 (Kenny,
Albright, Malloy, & Kashy, 1994). Although an average consensus correlation of .52 emerged in a
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meta-analysis of round-robin studies (i.e., studies in which an individual judges multiple others and
multiple others also judge the individual; Kenny & West, 2010), even this finding simultaneously
demonstrates the reality that people have discrepant perceptions despite moderate agreement.
Is it possible for people to capitalize on these discrepancies? In other words, if people agree
to disagree – or simply acknowledge that they disagree – they may benefit from knowledge of
others’ perceptions. When target self-perceptions are more accurate than other-perceptions (e.g.,
on traits such as “worried” and “introspective”; Vazire, 2010), having insight into how a target sees
him/herself may be one path toward greater other-knowledge. Likewise, when other-perceptions
are more accurate than self-perceptions (e.g., on traits such as “charming” and “likeable”; Vazire,
2010), having insight into how a target is seen by others could also lead to greater other-knowledge.
Regardless of whether knowledge of identity and reputation may occur for individual traits versus
more holistic personality profiles, such awareness of others’ perceptions should supplement a
perceiver’s own impressions and be associated with a greater likelihood of acquiring accurate
information about a target, regardless of how (in)accurate (in the traditional sense) or discrepant
his/her own perceptions are.
Meta-cognitive ability. Do people understand that their own perceptions are not always
universally shared? Even through adulthood, people continue to make egocentric social judgments
in everyday life (e.g., Holmes, 1968; Krueger & Clement, 1994; Ross, Greene, & House, 1977),
and thus it is not surprising that people have little awareness of their limitations in accurately
perceiving others and tend to be overly confident about how accurate their impressions of others
are (e.g., Dunning, Griffin, Milojkovic, & Ross, 1990; Swann & Gill, 1997). Nonetheless, it
is possible for people to correct for their egocentric tendencies (Epley, Morewedge, & Keysar,
2004), especially when explicitly asked to consider others’ perspectives (Lord, Lepper, & Preston,
1984). Previous research in the person perception literature has shown that people have impressive
meta-cognitive skills when it comes to understanding how others’ perceptions differ from their
own self-perceptions. For instance, people have insight into others’ perceptions of their own
personality (i.e., meta-accuracy; Carlson & Kenny, 2012; Carlson, Vazire, & Oltmanns, 2011),
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know how specific others see them (i.e., differential meta-accuracy; Carlson & Furr, 2009), and
know that even close others do not see them exactly as they see themselves (i.e., meta-insight;
Carlson, Vazire, & Furr, 2011).
While such previous research has focused exclusively on self -knowledge, perhaps these meta-cognitive
abilities exist for other-knowledge as well. If this is the case, people may have knowledge of
others’ self-views and reputations, and may know when such perceptions differ from their own.
Even if people are not well calibrated in their beliefs about the accuracy of their interpersonal
perceptions (Dunning et al., 1990; Swann & Gill, 1997), acquiring knowledge of others’ perceptions
would allow them to acknowledge that others do not share their perceptions without having to
admit that they are biased (or explicitly accuse others of being inaccurate). Currently, no model of
other-knowledge has been developed to assess knowledge of identity and reputation. Accordingly,
I introduce the KOP model as a framework to investigate this pragmatic type of other-knowledge
(see the Analytical Model and Approach for a full description).
Knowledge of identity and reputation. Knowledge of identity and reputation are important
regardless of whether others’ perceptions reflect reality, as they reflect the subjective realities of
targets and others. For instance, such awareness can promote interpersonal understanding, which
is necessary for harmony in personal relationships (Finkenauer & Righetti, 2011) and achieving
social goals in the workplace (Caruso, Epley, & Bazerman, 2006).
A recent study has conducted an initial test of the phenomena I have described with regard to
a single characteristic (Solomon & Vazire, 2014). The authors compared target, romantic partner,
and friend ratings of a target’s physical attractiveness and examined romantic partners’ knowledge
of target and friend ratings. Their findings demonstrated that despite romantic partners’ positively
biased and somewhat idiosyncratic views of the targets, partners achieved knowledge of identity
and reputation. Partners knew that their own perceptions of the targets’ attractiveness were more
positive than targets’ and friends’ views. It is especially noteworthy that romantic partners achieved
this type of other-knowledge given that physical attractiveness is an overt attribute that is consistent
across contexts. Thus, it was quite impressive that romantic partners’ views were so discrepant, yet
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they were able to separate their own views of targets’ physical attractiveness from others’ views
at a conscious level. The KOP model builds upon the authors’ suggestion that knowing another
person well may require more than having an accurate impression of her in the absolute sense;
rather, it may involve being able to see her from multiple perspectives, including her identity and
her reputation.
One aspect of knowing a person well is knowing how she sees herself (i.e., her identity).
Studying the extent to which people have awareness of others’ self-perceptions has a long history
(e.g., Bender & Hastorf, 1950; Cowden, 1955; Dymond, 1949; Gage & Cronbach, 1955; Taft,
1966), but is rarely utilized in personality research today (cf. Simms, Zelazny, Yam, & Gros, 2010).
Similar to the way that empathic accuracy reflects one’s ability to accurately infer another person’s
thoughts and feelings, identity accuracy reflects one’s knowledge of another person’s broader
self-views. Some research has shown that romantic partners are aware of targets’ self-perceptions
of personality traits (Cowden, 1955; Dymond, 1954) and evaluative attributes such as physical
attractiveness (Solomon & Vazire, 2014). Unsurprisingly, people want important others to know
their identities (or self-perceptions; Goffman, 1959; Swann, 1996) and perceivers actively try to
infer the identity that has been jointly negotiated with an individual (Goffman, 1959). One study
found that identity comprehension by others (recognition of the relative importance of another
person’s identities) is associated with positive work outcomes (e.g., higher satisfaction and less
absenteeism) for that person (Thatcher & Greer, 2008). Given that identity can be conceptualized
as the self-perceptions that underlie one’s personal goals and social transactions (Eccles, 2009),
achieving knowledge of identity should lead to a better understanding of another person’s motives
and predictions of his/her behaviors.
Another aspect of knowing a person well is knowing how she is seen by others (i.e., her
reputation). The theory of social reality suggests that knowing a target’s reputation is knowing
the target’s actual standing on a particular trait (Hofstee, 1994). Without definitively knowing
who is accurate, knowing the extent to which one’s own perception is consistent (or discrepant)
from others’ perceptions of a target is, at the very least, one way for an individual to understand
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how connected he is to social reality. Knowledge of reputation has received virtually no attention
in the person perception literature (cf. Solomon & Vazire, 2014), however there is a small body
of research examining a related concept referred to as third-party meta-perception (Kenny, 1994;
Kenny & DePaulo, 1993; Laing, Phillipson, & Lee, 1966), which reflects how one person thinks
another person perceives a third person. For instance, regardless of people’s own impressions of a
target, people can accurately guess how much another person likes a target (Kenny, Bond, Mohr, &
Horn, 1996) and another person’s level of romantic interest in specific others (Place, Todd, Penke,
& Asendorpf, 2009). Also, high self-monitors seem to be especially accurate about the status
dynamics of their social groups (Flynn, Reagans, Amanatullah, & Ames, 2006), suggesting that
some people are naturally inclined to pay closer attention to others’ perceptions of one another.
More generally, understanding individuals’ reputations is fundamental to social interactions and,
thus, it is no surprise that keeping track of others’ reputations is inherent in everyday life (Tennie,
Frith, & Frith, 2010). With respect to evaluating the validity of informational cues about others,
epistemic vigilance (defined as attention to how reliable the source of information is and how likely
the information is to be true; Sperber et al., 2010) is theorized to serve as an important mechanism
in reputation monitoring (Tennie et al., 2010). It is possible that such epistemic vigilance could
help explain why people may achieve knowledge of reputation, as well as identity, even when their
own views differ from others’.
Accuracy criteria for other-knowledge. In general, capturing accuracy in personality judgments
is considered to be quite difficult (see Funder, 1987; Funder & West, 1993). According to Funder,
the two best criteria for accuracy in the traditional sense are interjudge agreement (i.e., the agreement
among judgments by different perceivers) and behavioral prediction (i.e., the degree to which
perceptions of personality are associated with targets’ behaviors or real-world outcomes; e.g.,
health, occupational success, divorce). However, interjudge agreement (most notably, self-other
agreement, consensus, and realistic accuracy) relies on subjective reporting, which may or may
not reflect reality (the target’s actual personality). Even the more objective criteria associated
with behavioral prediction (e.g., the controlled coding of “behavioral markers” of personality in
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a laboratory (e.g., Back, Schmukle, & Egloff, 2009; Gottman, Coan, Carrere, & Swanson, 1998;
Simpson, Winterheld, Rholes, & Oria, 2007; Vazire, 2010), and audio recordings that capture
real-world behavior with the Electronically Activated Recorder (EAR; Mehl, Pennebaker, Crow,
Dabbs, & Price, 2001; Mehl, Vazire, Ramrez-Esparza, Slatcher, & Pennebaker, 2007) are not ideal.
For example, behaviors manifested in a laboratory lose some ecological validity (i.e., targets may
behave differently in their natural environments) and EAR recordings require significant resources
such as the cost of the device and time to transfer the recordings into usable data.
In addition to the problems associated with various traditional accuracy criteria for assessing
other-knowledge, none of these approaches shed light on knowledge of others’ perceptions or the
extent to which people are consciously aware that others do not share their views of another person.
Although the underlying questions that drive traditional accuracy research in the personality literature
are compelling, examining identity and reputation accuracy and insight may provide a relatively
clearer and simpler way to measure other-knowledge. Specifically, knowledge of a target’s identity
can be assessed by comparing a perceiver’s impressions of a target’s self-perceptions directly to the
target’s actual self-perceptions. Likewise, knowledge of a target’s reputation can be assessed by
comparing a perceiver’s impressions of others’ perceptions of the target directly to others’ actual
perceptions of the target. Not only can such reports be obtained easily from targets and others
(e.g., friend and family informants) and at low-cost (e.g., Vazire, 2006), but such accuracy criteria
also provide benchmarks that are absolute and serve as direct connections between “perceptions
of reality and reality itself” (Funder & West, 1993, p. 459). Overall, examining this type of
other-knowledge offers a straightforward way to operationalize reality by circumventing the thorny
criterion problem associated with traditional accuracy research.
Accuracy Versus Insight
The primary focus of the current study was to examine knowledge of identity and knowledge of
reputation, both of which have an accuracy component and an insight component. The operationalizations
of accuracy and insight for both types of knowledge are later summarized in Table 2, but it is
important to initially provide the rationale for understanding these two components in the context
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of the current study. First, identity accuracy and reputation accuracy reflect a baseline estimate
of the extent to which perceivers are able to infer targets’ identities and reputations. However, it
is possible that some perceivers will achieve identity and reputation accuracy simply by assuming
that a target’s identity and reputation are consistent with the perceiver’s own views of the target.
Thus, to rule out the possibility that knowledge of identity and reputation are simply driven by
this type of similarity bias (also referred to as assumed agreement), I also examined identity and
reputation insight. The insight components estimate explicit knowledge of others’ perceptions
beyond perceivers’ own impressions of targets by controlling for the agreement between perceivers’
own impressions of targets and targets’ identities and reputations. By removing the variance
explained by perceivers’ own perceptions, I can shed light on the extent to which perceivers achieve
knowledge of others’ perceptions specifically when perceivers personally disagree with targets and
others. In short, the accuracy model estimates knowledge of others’ perceptions for all perceivers
regardless of the overlap with perceivers’ own perceptions, whereas the insight model estimates
knowledge of others’ perceptions only for perceivers whose own perceptions are distinguishable
from targets’ and others’ views.
The accuracy versus insight issue described here is similar to other issues related to bias
constructs that sometimes coexist with accuracy; e.g., assumed similarity (Kenny & Acitelli,
2001; Marks & Miller, 1987), projection (Krueger, 1998), and idealization (Murray, Holmes, &
Griffin, 1996). For instance, it is well established that when assumed similarity is combined with
actual similarity, individuals can (coincidentally) achieve accuracy (Cronbach, 1955; Kenny &
Acitelli, 2001) regardless of the conceptual differences between achieving accuracy in this way
and having conscious knowledge. Thus, it is clear to see how accuracy could be spuriously high
if it is entirely or mostly driven by assumed similarity (assumed agreement). Similar to how I
operationalize identity and reputation insight by accounting for overlapping perceptions, previous
researchers have introduced constructs such as “similarity-free agreement” (Cohen, Panter, Turan,
Morse, & Kim, 2013) and “meta-insight” (Carlson, Vazire, & Furr, 2011) to overcome this issue.
Nonetheless, because accuracy and insight capture different information, I examined knowledge
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of identity and reputation in terms of both components.
Overview of Current Research
Simultaneously juggling multiple perspectives of a single target is a meta-cognitive process
that has received little attention in the person perception literature. As described, the current study
investigated the extent to which people have knowledge of others’ perceptions of a well-acquainted
target. To illustrate the questions I tested, consider the friendship pair comprised of Tim (the target)
and Paul (the perceiver). Using the KOP model, I first examined the following questions: Does
Paul have an accurate perception of Tim’s identity and reputation (i.e., identity and reputation
accuracy)? Does Paul have insight into Tim’s identity and reputation even when those views
differ from Paul’s own perception of Tim (i.e., identity and reputation insight). After providing a
basic foundation for understanding knowledge of others’ perceptions, I then conducted exploratory
moderation analyses. For instance, under what circumstances is Paul’s knowledge of identity and
reputation likely to be enhanced (or undermined)? The rationale and description of the analyses
and findings for this final question follow the primary results.
As Solomon and Vazire (2014) point out, there may be more to knowing another person well
than the traditional interpersonal perception literature suggests – knowing someone’s identity and
reputation reflects being able to see someone from the inside out. Following Swann’s (1984)
pragmatic approach to understanding the person perception process as it is “woven into the fabric
of people’s ongoing social relationships” (Swann, 1984, p. 472), I focus on knowledge of the
subjective realities of the self and others that pertain to a well-acquainted friend. This may be an
important avenue of research that is distinct from, yet compliments, the traditional approach toward
assessing other-knowledge. That is, it may be possible for highly adept judges of personality to
be tethered to reality in different ways: some may know a target’s personality as it is actually
manifested, and others may know practical information about a target’s identity and reputation in
relation to their own views.
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Method
Participants
Participants used in the current analyses are referred to as primary participants, best friends,
or general informants. Primary participants (N = 205 for knowledge of identity analyses and N
= 180 for knowledge of reputation analyses) were a subset of undergraduates (at least 18 years
of age; M = 19.4) who participated in a larger, longitudinal study at Washington University in St.
Louis (total N = 435; the inclusion criteria are described below). Approximately 5% were Hispanic
or Latino. Approximately 57% were Caucasian, 24% were Asian or Asian American, 10% were
Black or African American, less than 1% were American Indian or Alaska Native, less than 1%
were Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander, and 6% indicated ”Other” for their race. Primary
participants were recruited via the Psychology Department Human Subject Pool, flyers posted on
campus, announcements made in classes, and postcards mailed to students. The data used were
collected at Wave 1. At Wave 1, all primary participants completed self-report questionnaires
about their personalities and other attributes (as well as a variety of other tasks and questionnaires)
in person at the Personality and Self-Knowledge Laboratory on campus. Primary participants also
provided reports about their romantic partners’ and best friends’ personalities and other attributes.
They received monetary compensation for their participation.
Primary participants were asked to nominate up to ten informants who knew them well and
would be willing to complete online questionnaires about the primary participants’ personalities
and other attributes throughout the course of the study. Specifically, participants nominated a
local best friend who completed a longer questionnaire than the other informants and provided
self-reports of his/her own personality. Several other friend informants, referred to as general
informants, were also nominated (including a local friend or a roommate, a hometown friend,
a friend of the opposite sex, and two other friends). In addition, participants were asked to
nominate four non-friend informants when applicable (a romantic partner, an ex-romantic partner,
a parent, and a sibling), although they were not included in the current analyses. On average,
all informants were emailed within one month of their nomination with an explanation of why
13

they were contacted and instructions for completing the online questionnaire (Vazire, 2006). All
informants and primary participants were told that their ratings were confidential and the primary
participants would not have access to the informants’ ratings. Up to three reminder e-mails
(one time per week) were sent to informants who had not yet responded. Based on the varying
length of questionnaires across informant types, informants received different amounts of monetary
compensation. The response rates for best friends and general informants were 57% and 43%,
respectively.
Inclusion criteria. For the analyses examining knowledge of identity, only primary participants
whose best friend completed the informant questionnaire at Wave 1 were included. Because
primary participants and best friends both provided ratings about themselves and each other, the
data were fully dyadic, meaning that in these analyses primary participants and best friends could
both serve as target (i.e., the individual being rated by the perceiver) and as perceiver (i.e., the
individual rating the target). Two hundred five of the 435 potential primary participants (47%) met
these inclusion criteria (27% male and 73% female), resulting in a total of 410 targets (205 dyads;
approximately 67% were same-sex female, 20% were same-sex male, and 13% were opposite-sex).
For the analyses examining knowledge of reputation, only primary participants whose best
friend and at least one general informant completed the informant questionnaire at Wave 1 were
included. This was necessary because the general informant data were used as the criterion
measure for reputation (how others actually see the primary participant). Unlike the analyses for
knowledge of identity, these data were not dyadic – in these analyses, primary participants served
only as targets and best friends served only as perceivers. One hundred eighty of the 435 potential
primary participants (41%) were included (25% male and 75% female), resulting in a total of 180
targets (180 dyads; approximately 70% were same-sex female, 19% were same-sex male, and 11%
were opposite-sex).
Primary Measures
The assessments of identity, other-perception, perceived identity, reputation, and perceived
reputation were based on items from the Big Five Inventory (BFI; Benet-Martnez & John, 1998;
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John & Srivastava, 1999). Two BFI items reflecting each Big Five trait were used (i.e., “is
outgoing, sociable” and “tends to be quiet” for extraversion, “is sometimes rude to others” and
“is considerate and kind to almost everyone” for agreeableness, “is a reliable worker” and “is
lazy” for conscientiousness, “is relaxed, handles stress well” and “worries a lot” for neuroticism,
and “is curious about many different things” and “has an active imagination” for openness).1
Ratings were made on a 15-point Likert-type scale with the following descriptive anchors: 1 =
Disagree Strongly, 8 = Neither Agree nor Disagree, and 15 = Agree Strongly (with the labels
Disagree Moderately between 3 and 4, Disagree a Little between 5 and 6, Agree a Little between
10 and 11, and Agree Moderately between 12 and 13). When applicable, all perceiver ratings (i.e.,
other-perceptions, perceived identity ratings, and perceived reputation ratings) were provided for
each BFI item before moving on to the next BFI item, and ratings could be changed if a subsequent
question led to further deliberation about a previous rating. See Table 1 for summary statistics of
the primary measures for each BFI item. (Correlation matrices across primary measures for each
aggregated Big Five trait are available in the Supplemental Material.)
Identity. Primary participants and best friends provided self-perceptions (how primary participants
and best friends actually see themselves; e.g., “I am someone who... is outgoing, sociable.”).
Other-perception. Primary participants and best friends provided their own impressions of
each other (how primary participants perceive their best friends and how best friends perceive the
primary participants; e.g., “[Best friend’s/Primary participant’s name]... is outgoing, sociable.”).
Perceived identity. Primary participants and best friends were asked to guess how the other
person rated themselves (how primary participants believe their best friends see themselves and
how best friends believe primary participants see themselves; e.g., “[Best friend’s/Primary participant’s
name] sees him/herself... as outgoing, sociable.”).
Reputation. General informants provided their own impressions of the primary participants
(how others actually perceive the primary participants; e.g., “[Primary participant’s name] is
1

Only two items for each Big Five trait were used due to constraints related to the length of the questionnaire. As
mentioned, the data used in the current study are part of a larger study about personality and self- and other-knowledge.
Although self- and other-perceptions were collected for the full BFI measure, perceived identity and perceived
reputation ratings were only collected for the ten BFI items described.
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Table 1
Descriptive Statistics for Primary Measures
Identity

Outgoing, sociable
Tends to be quiet
Rude to others
Considerate and kind
Reliable worker
Lazy
Relaxed, handles stress well
Worries a lot
Curious
Active imagination

M
10.04
8.77
9.26
11.37
12.06
8.51
6.65
9.45
12.20
10.94

SE
(3.74)
(4.32)
(3.97)
(3.27)
(2.72)
(4.06)
(3.60)
(3.98)
(2.54)
(3.32)

Otherperception
M
SE
11.64 (3.04)
10.28 (3.83)
9.83 (4.23)
11.85 (2.95)
11.85 (2.97)
10.11 (4.03)
6.60 (3.29)
8.15 (3.74)
11.40 (2.69)
10.56 (3.01)

Perceived
identity
M
SE
11.15 (3.36)
9.82 (3.98)
10.20 (3.52)
11.84 (2.44)
12.15 (2.33)
9.87 (3.96)
6.63 (3.13)
8.77 (3.60)
11.59 (2.50)
10.93 (2.67)

Reputation
M
11.33
9.55
10.21
11.91
12.40
11.16
6.38
7.68
11.65
10.90

SE
(2.85)
(3.35)
(3.30)
(2.66)
(2.22)
(2.95)
(3.01)
(3.30)
(2.06)
(2.58)

Perceived
reputation
M
SE
11.54 (3.30)
10.03 (4.25)
10.35 (3.99)
12.04 (2.95)
11.96 (2.79)
10.52 (3.94)
5.71 (3.17)
7.21 (3.54)
10.97 (2.55)
10.21 (2.79)

Note. Table reports mean values of primary measures for each Big Five Inventory (BFI) item. Standard
deviations in parentheses.

someone who... is outgoing, sociable.”). Reputation is the aggregate of all available general
informant ratings.
Perceived reputation. Best friends were asked to guess how others would rate the primary
participants (how best friends believe others see the primary participants; e.g., “Other people see
[Primary participant’s name] ... as outgoing, sociable.”).
Analytical Model and Approach
Returning to my example about Tim and Paul, I used the KOP model to test the following
questions: 1) Does Paul know how Tim sees himself (identity accuracy)? 2) Is this knowledge
simply the result of Paul assuming Tim sees himself the same way he sees Tim, or does Paul
have insight into how Tim’s self-perception differs from Paul’s own impression of Tim (identity
insight)? 3) Does Paul know how others see Tim (reputation accuracy)? 4) Is this knowledge
simply the result of Paul assuming others see Tim the same way he sees Tim, or does Paul have
insight into how others’ perceptions of Tim differ from Paul’s own impression of Tim (reputation
insight)?
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See Table 2 for a summary of how each type of knowledge was assessed. Identity (targets’
self-perceptions) and reputation (general informants’ perceptions of targets) served as the dependent
variables. For identity accuracy and reputation accuracy, identity and reputation were predicted
from perceivers’ perceived identity ratings and perceivers’ perceived reputation ratings, respectively.
The only difference between the models for accuracy and insight is the additional component in
the insight models to control for perceivers’ own perceptions (other-perceptions) of targets. This
component enables the estimation of perceivers’ insight into targets’ identities and reputations
above and beyond perceivers’ own impressions of the target. As previously described, if such
insight exists even with this control, I can rule out the possibility that knowledge of others’
perceptions is merely a methodological artifact due to assumed agreement; rather, such insight
would reflect explicit knowledge of others’ perceptions at a conscious level when perceivers’ own
perceptions are discrepant from targets’ and others’. The full equations for the insight model are
presented in Appendix A.2 For each type of knowledge, the extent to which perceived ratings
(of identity or reputation) predict others’ actual perceptions (actual identity or reputation) reflects
knowledge of others’ perceptions (knowledge of identity or reputation). Using the KOP model,
coefficients (i.e., β1ij in Appendix A) of 1 would reflect perfect accuracy or insight, while these
same coefficients of 0 would reflect no accuracy or insight.3
To assess knowledge of identity and reputation in terms of both accuracy and insight, I used
two approaches: a personality profile-based (idiographic) approach and a trait-based (nomothetic)
approach. For the profile-based approach, I used a multilevel framework with varying intercepts
and varying slopes at the item level to account for the variance across items.4 I examined distinctive
knowledge of others’ perceptions (i.e., distinctive identity accuracy, distinctive identity insight,
distinctive reputation accuracy, and distinctive reputation insight) to rule out the possibility that
2
Specifically, I present the identity insight model as it is the most complex, and can be easily modified for each
type of knowledge I assessed. See Appendix A for an explanation of how to adapt the KOP model to examine identity
accuracy, reputation accuracy, and reputation insight.
3
Because I standardized both target and perceiver ratings, this one-to-one comparison accounts for systematic
differences in the variances of target and perceiver reports.
4
For the profile-based identity models, I used non-hierarchical, multilevel models with cross-effects for both dyads
and items.
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Table 2
Knowledge of Others’ Perceptions
Identity
Accuracy Perceived identity ratings predict
target self-perceptions

Reputation
Perceived reputation ratings predict
general informants’ perceptions of targets

Insight

Perceived reputation ratings predict
general informants’ perceptions of targets
controlling for perceiver other-perceptions

Perceived identity ratings predict
target self-perceptions controlling
for perceiver other-perceptions

people were achieving knowledge of identity and reputation simply by describing how the typical
person sees himself and how the typical person is seen by others (the equivalent of controlling for
normative or stereotype accuracy; Biesanz, 2010; Cronbach, 1955; Furr, 2008). Thus, distinctive
knowledge of others’ perceptions reflects perceivers’ knowledge of the unique patterning of targets’
identities (self-perceptions) and reputations (informants’ perceptions of targets) across the ten BFI
items – or knowledge of the deviations in targets’ identities and reputations, respectively, from
the average target’s identity and reputation across each item. Distinctive variables (or distinctive
personality profiles) for both dependent variables (identity and reputation) were computed by
subtracting the normative mean for each respective BFI item. For example, distinctive identity
reflects targets’ self-perceptions on each of the ten items after subtracting the normative self-perception
mean for each item.
Using the trait-based approach, I examined knowledge of others’ perceptions one trait at a
time at the level of the entire sample (i.e., there were no within-person estimates). Thus, it was
unnecessary to account for the variability across traits and to include the distinctive variables
described above. Importantly, however, in order to appropriately compare the coefficients across
the trait-based and profile-based approaches, I used the standardized distinctive dependent variables
in the trait-based models (this choice was necessary because the standard deviation of the distinctive
variables is different from the standard deviation of the non-distinctive variables). Before running
any analyses, I first computed scale scores for each of the Big Five traits (i.e., the average of the
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two BFI items for each trait, after recoding any reverse-score items) for each primary measure.5
Finally, for all knowledge of identity analyses, I also used multilevel modeling to account for
the interdependence of ratings within dyads (as each member of the friendship pairs was both
a target and a perceiver).6 Accounting for such interdependence was unnecessary for assessing
knowledge of reputation because the perceived reputation measure was only obtained for one
member of each dyad (specifically, for primary participants), and thus each primary participant and
best friend were included in the analyses once (serving only as target and perceiver, respectively).
All continuous variables were standardized for ease of interpretation.
Primary Results
Do well-acquainted friends agree (or disagree) with others?
Before examining knowledge of identity and reputation, I examined the extent to which well-acquainted
friends (i.e., perceivers) agree with targets’ self-perceptions (i.e., identities) and with others’ perceptions
of targets (i.e., reputations) using both a profile-based approach and a trait-based approach.7 I refer
to these associations as target-perceiver agreement and informant-perceiver agreement, respectively.
I predicted target identity and reputation from perceiver other-perceptions and employed multilevel
modeling when appropriate (i.e., to account for the variability across traits when using the profile-based
approach and the interdependence within dyads when predicting identity); see Table 3 for these
results.8 First, using the profile-based approach, I found evidence of target-perceiver agreement.
5

The alpha reliabilities of the five composites for each primary measure were not all above the minimum
acceptable level of .70 (e.g., DeVellis, 1991; Nunnally, 1967; Robinson, Shaver, & Wrightsman, 1991). See the
Supplemental Material for these statistics. Nonetheless, the primary analyses were not affected, as the focus was
on assessing knowledge of perceptions of personality as opposed to using personality itself as a predictor of a given
dependent variable.
6
However, because each person was rated by and rated only one person, the model cannot differentiate between
target effects and perceiver effects. Instead of target effects and perceiver effects, the KOP model can estimate
target-perceiver effects, which would reflect the effect of a specific target being perceived by a specific perceiver.
7
Similar to the trait-based approach described for assessing knowledge of identity and reputation, it was
unnecessary to account for the variability across traits and to include the distinctive variables when assessing agreement
using the trait-based approach. Importantly, however, in order to appropriately compare the coefficients across the
trait-based and profile-based approaches, I used the standardized distinctive dependent variables in the trait-based
models (again, this choice was necessary because the standard deviation of the distinctive variables is different from
the standard deviation of the non-distinctive variables).
8
For the results I report, I allowed both the intercepts and slopes for perceiver other-perceptions to vary randomly
by item (when using the profile-approach). The results were similar when I also allowed the slopes for perceiver
other-perceptions to vary randomly by dyad, but I report the more parsimonious models without these random slopes
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The results indicated that perceivers’ own perceptions of targets predict targets’ distinctive identities;
that is, perceivers moderately agree with targets (b = .39, SE = .04, t = 10.25, 95% confidence
interval (CI) [.32, .46]) about the unique patterning of targets’ personalities across the ten BFI
items. Using the trait-based approach, I also found some evidence of target-perceiver agreement
for each Big Five trait (b = .72, SE = .05, t = 15.12, 95% CI [.62, .81] for extraversion; b = .33,
SE = .05, t = 7.28, 95% CI [.24, .42] for agreeableness; b = .44, SE = .05, t = 8.91, 95% CI [.35,
.54] for conscientiousness; b = .45, SE = .05, t = 9.00, 95% CI [.35, .55] for neuroticism; b = .29,
SE = .05, t = 5.82, 95% CI [.19, .39] for openness). Consistent with the personality literature, the
magnitude of target-perceiver agreement (traditionally referred to as self-other agreement) varies
by trait.
With regard to agreement with others, I first found evidence for informant-perceiver agreement
using the profile-based approach. The results indicated that perceivers’ own perceptions of targets
moderately agree with others’ (aggregated) distinctive perceptions of targets (i.e., distinctive reputation)
across the BFI items (b = .44, SE = .04, t = 12.41, 95% CI [.37, .51]). Using the trait-based
approach, the results showed that perceivers also agree with others on each Big Five trait (b = .75,
SE = .07, t = 10.54, 95% CI [.61, .89] for extraversion; b = .45, SE = .07, t = 5.96, 95% CI [.30,
.59] for agreeableness; b = .39, SE = .07, t = 5.87, 95% CI [.26, .51] for conscientiousness; b =
.58, SE = .08, t = 7.05, 95% CI [.42, .74] for neuroticism; b = .34, SE = .07, t = 4.68, 95% CI [.20,
.49] for openness); see Table 3.
Altogether, these findings demonstrate that friends (like Paul) generally agree with targets
(like Tim) and others (like Tim’s other friends) when it comes to the unique patterning of targets’
personalities as well as targets’ standings on individual Big Five traits. Consistent with previous
research demonstrating that consensus is greater than self-other agreement (e.g., John & Robins,
1993; Kenny & West, 2010), the current results trend in a similar direction – friends agree more
with other perceivers (i.e., informant-perceiver agreement) than with targets (i.e., target-perceiver
agreement).
for the sake of simplicity, as I examine dyad effects in the analyses of dyad-level moderators.
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.68* (.04)
.49* (.08)
.26* (.09)
.70* (.07)
.22 (.19)
.54* (.20)

.27* (.03)
.18* (.03)
.42* (.03)
.12* (.04)
.35* (.05)

.75* (.07)

.44* (.04)
.41* (.03)

.72* (.05)

.39* (.04)

Ext
b SE

.03 (.17)
.42* (.16)

.43* (.08)

.26* (.07)
.16* (.07)

.40* (.05)

.45* (.07)

.48* (.15)
-.01 (.14)

.47* (.07)

.37* (.08)
.19* (.08)

.52* (.05)

.39* (.07)

.44* (.05)

-.04 (.14)
.61* (.13)

.48* (.09)

.29* (.08)
.22* (.08)

.46* (.05)

.58* (.08)

.45* (.05)

Trait-based Approach
Con
Neu
b SE
b SE

.33* (.05)

Agr
b SE

.06 (.14)
.30* (.13)

.33* (.08)

.32* (.09)
.03 (.09)

.35* (.05)

.34* (.07)

.29* (.05)

Ope
b
SE

Note. Table reports the standardized regression coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) for predicting agreement and each type
of knowledge of others’ perceptions. Ext = Extraversion, Agr = Agreeableness, Con = Conscientiousness, Neu = Neuroticism, and Ope =
Openness. For all values, * p < .05 (two-tailed test).

Target-Perceiver Agreement
Other-Perception
Informant-Perceiver Agreement
Other-Perception
Identity Accuracy
Perceived Identity
Identity Insight
Perceived Identity
Other-Perception
Reputation Accuracy
Perceived Reputation
Reputation Insight
Perceived Reputation
Other-Perception

Profile-based Approach
Personality Profile
b SE

Standardized Regression Coefficients and Standard Errors Predicting Agreement and Knowledge of Others’ Perceptions

Table 3

Identity and Reputation Accuracy
I next examined identity and reputation accuracy to understand the extent to which friends’
perceptions of targets’ identities and reputations agree with targets’ actual identities and reputations,
regardless of how any overlap between perceivers’ own views of targets and targets’ identities
and reputations influences the accuracy effects. First, when using the profile-based approach, the
results indicated that perceivers achieve moderate levels of distinctive identity accuracy (b = .41,
SE = .03, t = 12.85, 95% CI [.35, .47]). Similarly, perceivers achieve identity accuracy for each
Big Five trait as well (b = .68, SE = .04, t = 16.81, 95% CI [.60, .76] for extraversion; b = .40, SE
= .05, t = 7.74, 95% CI [.30, .50] for agreeableness; b = .52, SE = .05, t = 10.16, 95% CI [.42, .63]
for conscientiousness; b = .46, SE = .05, t = 9.44, 95% CI [.37, .56] for neuroticism; b = .35, SE =
.05, t = 6.96, 95% CI [.25, .44] for openness); see Table 3.
Next, the results showed that perceivers achieve moderate levels of distinctive reputation accuracy
using the profile-based approach (b = .42, SE = .03, t = 14.20, 95% CI [.37, .48]). Similarly, using
the trait-based approach, I also found that perceivers achieve reputation accuracy for each Big
Five trait (b = .70, SE = .07, t = 10.06, 95% CI [.56, .83] for extraversion; b = .43, SE = .08, t
= 5.24, 95% CI [.27, .59] for agreeableness; b = .47, SE = .07, t = 6.77, 95% CI [.33, .60] for
conscientiousness; b = .48, SE = .09, t = 5.10, 95% CI [.29, .66] for neuroticism; b = .33, SE = .08,
t = 3.98, 95% CI [.17, .49] for openness); see Table 3.
In other words, friends have accurate perceptions of the unique within-person patterning of
targets’ identities and reputations, as well as accurate perceptions of targets’ identities and reputations
for individual traits. However, because perceivers’ own impressions of targets also agree significantly
with targets’ identities and reputations (see previous section), it is possible that such identity and
reputation accuracy is driven entirely by the similarity of perceivers’ own perceptions. Such
accuracy could be due to perceivers actually agreeing with targets’ identities and reputations or
correctly assuming that their own perceptions of targets agree with targets’ identities and reputations.
Because the latter scenario reflects achieving accuracy by chance rather than explicit knowledge
of others’ perceptions, I next examined identity and reputation insight to test the extent to which
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perceivers are aware of targets’ identities and reputations even when their own perceptions differ
from targets’ and others’ views.
Identity Insight
Do people have insight into their friends’ identities, even when they personally see their friends
differently from how their friends see themselves? Although the initial findings I reported indicated
that friends and targets tend to have similar perceptions of targets’ personalities (i.e., target-perceiver
agreement), there is still a significant amount of disagreement among friends and targets. Testing
for identity insight allowed me to examine whether friends can see beyond their own discrepant
perceptions and understand how targets’ self-views differ from their own. For example, it is
possible that Paul has knowledge about Tim’s self-views that goes above and beyond Paul’s own
perceptions of Tim. To test this idea, I examined the extent to which perceivers have insight into
targets’ identities, controlling for the agreement between perceivers’ own perceptions of targets and
targets’ identities (i.e., target-perceiver agreement). Using the profile-based approach, the results
indicated that perceivers achieve distinctive identity insight (b = .27, SE = .03, t = 8.19, 95% CI
[.21, .34]). Using the trait-based approach, I found that perceivers also achieve identity insight
with regard to each Big Five trait (b = .49, SE = .08, t = 6.27, 95% CI [.34, .64] for extraversion; b
= .26, SE = .07, t = 3.52, 95% CI [.12, .41] for agreeableness; b = .37, SE = .08, t = 4.62, 95% CI
[.21, .53] for conscientiousness; b = .29, SE = .08, t = 3.49, 95% CI [.13, .45] for neuroticism; b =
.32, SE = .09, t = 3.67, 95% CI [.15, .49] for openness); see Table 3.
In other words, well-acquainted friends have insight into targets’ unique patterning of self-perceptions
across the BFI items and targets’ self-perceptions on individual traits, regardless of how they
personally see the targets. As such, I can infer that identity insight is not driven simply by assuming
targets’ self-views are the same as perceivers’ own views of targets; rather, perceivers achieve
knowledge of identity at a conscious level.
Reputation Insight
Do people have insight into their friends’ reputations, even when they personally see their
friends differently from how others see their friends? Similar to the overlap between friends’
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perceptions of targets and targets’ identities (i.e., target-perceiver agreement), the initial findings
demonstrated that friends’ perceptions of targets also tend to agree with targets’ reputations (i.e.,
informant-perceiver agreement). Nonetheless, it is possible that in addition to such agreement,
people like Paul can accurately infer how others see their close friends like Tim, even when Paul’s
own perceptions differ from others’ views. This time I examined the extent to which perceivers
have insight into targets’ reputations, controlling for perceivers’ own impressions of targets. The
results indicated that perceivers achieve distinctive reputation insight using the profile-based approach
(b = .12, SE = .04, t = 3.02, 95% CI [.04, .19]), although this finding appears considerably weaker
than the finding for identity insight. Also, when using the trait-based approach, perceivers only
achieve reputation insight with regard to conscientiousness (b = .48, SE = .15, t = 3.10, 95% CI
[.18, .78]); see Table 3.
In other words, regardless of how they personally see the targets, well-acquainted friends have
some insight into the unique patterning of others’ perceptions of targets across the BFI items,
although they have no insight into targets’ reputations for individual Big Five traits (with the
exception of conscientiousness). Thus, friends have some awareness of the discrepancies between
their own views of targets and others’ views at the idiographic level (they do not always rely on
informant-perceiver agreement or assume others’ share their views), but overall, they lack insight
into targets’ reputations for specific traits.
What Moderates Knowledge of Others’ Perceptions?
The goal of this research not only pertains to the extent to which people achieve knowledge
of identity and reputation, but also concerns the conditions under which people are more likely to
acquire such knowledge. That is, under what circumstances is Paul’s knowledge of Tim’s identity
and reputation likely to be enhanced (or undermined)? I used previous research to inform several
exploratory moderation tests based on three of the four factors currently thought to moderate
the accuracy of other-perceptions (Funder & Colvin, 1997): judgability, judgmental ability, and
information level. Below I separated the potential moderators I examined into individual-level and
dyad-level factors and provide a general rationale for conducting each test.
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Individual-level factors
Achieving knowledge of identity and reputation may depend on individual-level characteristics
associated with target judgability and perceiver judgmental ability. Similar to the good target
and good judge moderators of the RAM (i.e., targets who are easy to read and perceivers who
tend to have accurate perceptions, respectively; Funder, 1995), I examined the extent to which
characteristics of both the target and perceiver moderate knowledge of others’ perceptions.
Gender. First, I examined the conditional effects of gender. Recent research on the good judge
indicates that women might be better than men at judging the personality of a minimally acquainted
target because they have more insight into what the average person’s personality profile is like
(Chan et al., 2011). Similarly, other studies have found that women are also more accurate when
judging intelligence (Murphy, Hall, & Colvin, 2003) and individual personality traits (Ambady,
Hallahan, & Rosenthal, 1995; Vogt & Colvin, 2003), as well as thoughts and emotion (Graham &
Ickes, 1997; Hall, 1984; Klein & Hodges, 2001). With respect to target gender, women may be
better targets because they are more accurate in their nonverbal expressions than men (Hall, 1984).
However, empirical findings do not support the myth that women are more talkative than men
(Mehl et al., 2007), indicating that men and women provide the same amount of verbal information.
Altogether, these studies provide a foundation for exploring whether gender moderates achieving
knowledge of others’ perceptions.
Perceived relationship quality. Second, although the actual quality of the relationship between
a target and perceiver is a characteristic of the dyad, it is possible that targets and perceivers have
different perceptions of their relationship. Potentially, higher relationship quality (reported by the
target or the perceiver) is associated with good information (Funder, 1995) and ultimately greater
knowledge of a target’s identity and reputation. For example, a target who reports a high level of
relationship quality may disclose more intimate information to the perceiver and a perceiver who
reports a high level of relationship quality may prioritize spending time with the target, both of
which could positively affect a perceiver’s knowledge of the target’s self-perceptions and others’
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perceptions of the target.9 These predictions are consistent with previous research suggesting that
relationship satisfaction is positively associated with accuracy (Connelly & Ones, 2010; Luo &
Snider, 2009; Neff & Karney, 2005).
Personality traits. Third, I focused on the extent to which knowledge of others’ perceptions
depends on the Big Five personality traits as the Big Five model (Goldberg, 1990; John, 1990;
McCrae & Costa, 1987) is the most widely accepted and extensively researched framework for
personality today. In the traditional sense of accuracy, psychologically well-adjusted individuals
are perceived more accurately by others and perceive others more accurately (Colvin, 1993; Human
& Biesanz, 2011a, 2011b). More specifically, in terms of the Big Five, one study found that
judgeable people (people who are known versus misunderstood) tend to be high in extraversion,
agreeableness, and conscientiousness, and low in neuroticism (Colvin, 1993). Although the correlates
of the Big Five with judgmental ability are not well established despite a long history of intrigue
and empirical investigation (Colvin & Bundick, 2001; Davis & Kraus, 1997; Taft, 1955; Vernon,
1933), being highly agreeable seems to be associated with accuracy in interpersonal perceptions
(Letzring, 2008).
It is possible that highly judgeable targets – based on the traditional operationalization of
accuracy – are similar to targets who help facilitate knowledge of identity and reputation. For
instance, given that people who are highly extraverted are especially expressive, sociable, and
talkative (Wilt & Revelle, 2009), extraverted targets may provide more opportunities for perceivers
to ascertain information about how targets see themselves and to observe others in response to
targets. Also, it is possible that people choose to spend more time with highly agreeable targets
because such targets tend to be good-natured, cooperative, and compassionate (Borkenau, 1988;
Graziano & Tobin, 2009). Similarly, highly conscientious targets may also be desirable for socializing
because they plan ahead, are dependable, and keep their promises (Jackson et al., 2010; Roberts,
Jackson, Fayard, Edmonds, & Meints, 2009). As such, target agreeableness and conscientiousness
9

Of course, the directionality issue inherent in correlational research precludes inferences regarding whether
higher quality relationships lead to greater transmission of good information or good information promotes higher
quality relationships.
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may facilitate more opportunities for perceivers to acquire relevant information about targets’
self-views and reputations. In contrast, targets who are highly neurotic may have inconsistent or
negative self-views and tend to be anxious (Widiger, 2009). Consequently, they may be motivated
to conceal their self-perceptions and withdraw from social situations, ultimately undermining the
ability of perceivers to achieve knowledge of identity and reputation, respectively. Given that
openness has fewer social components and consequences, I do not expect that target openness
moderates knowledge of others’ perceptions.
Although less is known about the relationships between Big Five traits and judgmental ability,
some research suggests that perceivers who promote environments in which targets can act naturally
are more likely to make accurate judgments (Letzring, 2008). I expect that by creating such
open atmospheres, these perceivers are more likely to ascertain relevant information about others’
perceptions as well. Accordingly, it is possible that extraverted perceivers are less likely to achieve
knowledge of others’ perceptions because of their tendency to dominate conversations (Harms,
Roberts, & Wood, 2007) and desire to be the center of attention (Ashton, Lee, & Paunonen,
2002; Hogan & Hogan, 2001), both of which can occur at the cost of inadvertent disregard for
others’ perspectives or hindering others from expressing themselves (Grant, Gino, & Hofmann,
2011). This notion that being extraverted could undermine one’s ability to see targets from multiple
points of view is consistent with research on the “dark sides” of extraversion (Hogan & Hogan,
2001; Judge, Piccolo, & Kosalka, 2009) and the negative association between high status and
understanding others’ thoughts, feelings, and visual perspective (Galinsky, Magee, Inesi, & Gruenfeld,
2006). Also, anxiety in perceivers is negatively associated with judgmental accuracy (Colvin
& Bundick, 2001) and, similarly, high neuroticism in perceivers may interfere with achieving
knowledge of others’ perceptions by making others feel less comfortable and willing to disclose
how they see themselves and others.
In contrast, highly agreeable perceivers may be especially good at achieving knowledge of
others’ perceptions, in the same way that they achieve accuracy in the traditional sense (Letzring,
2008), because they facilitate an atmosphere for natural and open conversation. Moreover, highly
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agreeable perceivers make efforts to get along and avoid interpersonal conflict (Graziano & Tobin,
2009), which should motivate perspective-taking (i.e., a highly agreeable perceiver is likely to
be more successful in cooperating with others if s/he understands others’ perceptions). Also,
although strong empirical support has not been found linking conscientiousness with traditional
operationalizations of accuracy (Christiansen, Wolcott-Burnam, Janovics, Burns, & Quirk, 2005),
it is plausible that conscientious perceivers acquire knowledge of others’ perceptions as a way
of fulfilling their interpersonal goals. Specifically, highly conscientious people tend to have better
interpersonal outcomes (Roberts et al., 2009), potentially because their persistence and goal-oriented
behaviors are particularly beneficial when they are motivated to succeed in their interpersonal
relationships (Wiggins & Trapnell, 1996). Thus, ascertaining knowledge of a target’s self-view
and reputation could help conscientious individuals reach this type of social goal. Finally, based
on research demonstrating that rigidity in thinking is negatively associated with perspective-taking
ability (e.g., Leith & Baumeister, 1998), I expect that perceivers who are high in openness will be
more likely to have knowledge of identity and reputation.
Global attachment style. Finally, another type of individual difference that could moderate
knowledge of others’ perceptions is global attachment style, which reflects relatively enduring
patterns of thoughts, feelings, and behaviors in close relationships in general. Whereas securely
attached individuals tend to have more intimate friendships (Grabill & Kerns, 2000; Mayseless,
Sharabany, & Sagi, 1997), insecurely attached individuals have less satisfying and lower quality
friendships (Bartholomew & Horowitz, 1991; Bippus & Rollin, 2003; Markiewicz, Doyle, &
Brendgen, 2001). As such, having an insecure attachment style could affect judgeability and
judgmental ability in a variety of ways; typically undermining knowledge of others’ perceptions,
but potentially enhancing such knowledge under certain circumstances.
Previous research has shown that anxiously attached romantic partners underestimate how
emotionally distant they are (Simpson, Rholes, & Winterheld, 2010) and avoidantly attached
individuals have lower quality friendships (Fraley, Roisman, Booth-LaForce, Owen, & Holland,
2013). Combined with the more general finding that targets who are insecurely attached are less
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willing to reveal personal information (Grabill & Kerns, 2000), I expect that insecurely attached
targets hinder knowledge of identity because they engage in less intimate interactions. In contrast,
with respect to knowledge of reputation, it is possible that perceivers of insecurely attached targets
may understand that others have different perceptions of the targets than they personally do. For
instance, attachment anxiety and avoidance could inhibit targets from acting naturally in social
situations, ultimately leading others to see them in a misconstrued light. As such, perceivers may
be especially likely to detect this difference in insecurely attached targets’ behaviors, actually
enhancing the opportunity to achieve knowledge of reputation. In short, with respect to target
attachment, I expect that anxiety- and avoidance-related attachment are both negatively associated
with knowledge of identity and that anxiety- and avoidance-related attachment are positively associated
with knowledge of reputation.
Perceiver attachment style could also moderate knowledge of others’ perceptions, but in slightly
different ways. Given that avoidantly attached individuals have less accurate perceptions of others
(Letzring, 2008), it is possible that avoidantly attached perceivers also ascertain less knowledge of
identity and reputation by avoiding deep, personal conversations (Mikulincer & Selinger, 2001),
thereby limiting the amount and quality of information they are able to acquire from targets
and others. In addition, previous research has indicated that attachment avoidance is negatively
associated with empathic accuracy among strangers (Izhaki-Costi & Schul, 2011), which is consistent
with my expectation that avoidantly attached perceivers have more difficulty accurately inferring
targets’ reputations. In contrast, anxiously attached perceivers may have developed skills that
help in achieving knowledge of identity, similarly to how anxiously attached romantic partners
achieve higher levels of empathic accuracy (by constantly attending to the targets) compared to
their less anxious counterparts (Simpson, Ickes, & Blackstone, 1995; Simpson, Ickes, & Grich,
1999). However, anxiously attached perceivers are less accurate in judging facial expressions
of emotion, despite being more vigilant when detecting changes in such expressions (Fraley,
Niedenthal, Marks, Brumbaugh, & Vicary, 2006). Given that individuals use facial expression cues
to infer others’ cognitions (Salovey & Mayer, 1990), being less skilled in accurately identifying
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facial expressions may put anxiously attached perceivers at a disadvantage with regard to knowledge
of reputation. Overall, with respect to perceiver attachment, I expect that anxiety-related attachment
is positively associated with knowledge of identity, whereas avoidance-related attachment is negatively
associated with knowledge of identity. I also expect that anxiety- and avoidance-related attachment
are both negatively associated with greater knowledge of reputation.
Dyad-level factors
Knowledge of identity and reputation may also depend on dyad-level characteristics. Building
on the notion that there is an interaction between a good judge and a good target, referred to as
a relationship effect (Funder, 1995), I expected that certain aspects of the friendship itself are
important for achieving knowledge of others’ perceptions.
Gender composition. First, I explored whether the gender composition of the dyad moderates
knowledge of others’ perceptions. With regard to knowledge of identity, individuals in same-sex
female dyads may not only be more accurate in their own perceptions of one another (Funder,
1995), but they may also achieve greater identity accuracy and insight than individuals in same-sex
male dyads due to the more intimate nature of their relationships (Fehr, 2004). This notion is
based on research demonstrating that women tend to spend their time together discussing emotions
and relationships, whereas men do activities or talk about impersonal topics (see Fehr 1996 for a
review). With regard to knowledge of reputation, an evolutionary perspective on mate selection
may suggest that individuals in same-sex dyads are especially likely to be aware of each other’s
reputations because it is important to know how their competition is perceived by others (Eagly
& Wood, 1999).10 More generally, it is possible that individuals in same-sex dyads may be more
likely than individuals in opposite-sex dyads to accurately assume that each other’s self-view and
reputation are similar to their own self-view and reputation. As previous research has demonstrated,
assumed similarity leads to accuracy when two people are actually alike (Cowden, 1955; Kenny &
Acitelli, 2001), and thus individuals in same-sex dyads may achieve greater knowledge of identity
and reputation if they correctly assume that targets’ identities and reputations are similar to their
10

This particular example assumes that targets and perceivers are heterosexual; thus, such a prediction is
constrained in its potential for identifying a moderator that is generalizable to everyone in the population.
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own.
Relationship duration. Second, I examined the conditional effects of relationship duration
with the expectation that good information is likely to influence knowledge of identity and reputation
similarly to how acquaintanceship (information level) is positively associated with accurate personality
judgments in the traditional sense (e.g., Biesanz, West, & Millevoi, 2007; Blackman & Funder,
1998; Colvin & Funder, 1991; Funder & Colvin, 1988; Letzring et al., 2006). For instance,
relationship duration could lead to more opportunities for self-disclosure (by the target) or observing
others’ responses to a target (by the perceiver), ultimately leading to greater knowledge of a target’s
identity and reputation. Although length of acquaintance does not always predict greater accuracy
in the traditional sense (e.g., Kenny, 2004; Watson et al., 2000), it is possible that a moderation
effect exists for knowledge of others’ perceptions.
Moderation Measures
To test potential moderators, I assessed the following individual- and dyad-level variables.
Individual-level. 1) Gender (0 = male, 1 = female), 2) Perceived relationship quality (assessed
via primary participant and best friend reports on five aggregated items (for the knowledge of
identity analyses: α = .89 and α = .92, respectively, and target-perceiver agreement r = .21; for
the knowledge of reputation analyses: α = .87 and α = .93, respectively, and target-perceiver
agreement r = .21); see Appendix B for the wording of these items), 3) the Big Five personality
traits (assessed by using primary participant and best friend self-perceptions on the ten BFI items
previously described for the primary analyses),11 and 4) Global attachment style (anxiety-related
attachment and avoidance-related attachment were assessed by using primary participant and best
friend self-reports, using a 7-point Likert-type scale, on the Relationship Structures questionnaire
of the Experiences in Close Relationships Revised (ECR-RS; Fraley, Waller, & Brennan, 2000),
modified for global attachment).12
11

When testing whether the Big Five personality traits moderate knowledge of identity, only the effects of perceiver
(but not target) personality could be examined because targets’ self-perceptions on the BFI items also comprised the
measure of identity (the dependent variable). However, with respect to knowledge of reputation, both target and
perceiver personality were tested as moderators because the measure of reputation (the dependent variable) is distinct
from the moderator variables (i.e., target and perceiver self-perceptions of the Big Five traits).
12
The two subscales (anxiety-related attachment and avoidance-related attachment) correlated positively with each
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Dyad-level. 1) Gender composition (assessed with two categorical variables: one dichotomous
variable indicating whether the dyad is opposite-sex (1 = yes, 0 otherwise) and one dichotomous
variable indicating whether the dyad is same-sex female (1 = yes, 0 otherwise)) and 2) Relationship
duration (assessed by averaging responses by primary participants and best friends about how long
they have known each other; M = 2.6 years and M = 2.3 years for the knowledge of identity and
reputation analyses, respectively; target-perceiver agreement r = .83 and r = .79).13
Moderation Analyses
Going back to the example of Tim and Paul, the last question I examined was: 5) Under what
circumstances is Paul’s knowledge of Tim’s identity and reputation likely to be enhanced? To
explore potential moderators, I tested whether achieving knowledge of identity and knowledge of
reputation (for both accuracy and insight) depends on characteristics of the target, perceiver, and
dyad. Specifically, I included interactions between perceived identity and reputation ratings and
each potential moderator (e.g., perceived identity rating × relationship duration) in the KOP model,
separately for each individual- and dyad-level variable (see Appendix A for the full equations).
These pathways are depicted in Figure 1a, 1b, 1c, and 1d. To provide a context for understanding
moderators of knowledge of others’ perceptions, I also examined whether these same factors
moderate target-perceiver agreement and informant-perceiver agreement by including interactions
between perceivers’ own perceptions of targets and each potential moderator (e.g., other-perception
× relationship duration; see Figure 2a and 2b).14 The interpretation of positive interaction terms
is described in Appendix A. To reduce the chance of false positives, I examined moderators only
using the profile-based approach and did not examine moderators for each trait separately.
other (for the knowledge of identity analyses: r = .20 and r = .19 for primary participants and best friends, respectively;
for the knowledge of reputation analyses: r = .16 and r = .23 for primary participants and best friends, respectively).
Both subscales had high reliabilities across respondents (for the knowledge of identity analyses: α = .87 and α = .88
for primary participant anxiety- and avoidance-related attachment, respectively, and α = .93 and α = .87 for best friend
anxiety- and avoidance-related attachment, respectively; for the knowledge of reputation analyses: α = .86 and α =
.88 for primary participant anxiety- and avoidance-related attachment, respectively, and α = .93 and α = .89 for best
friend anxiety- and avoidance-related attachment, respectively).
13
The relatively short average relationship duration is most likely due to the requirement that primary participants
could only nominate local (as opposed to long distance) best friends.
14
The full results for the moderation analyses pertaining to target-perceiver agreement and informant-perceiver
agreement are available upon request.
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Moderation Results
Individual-level Moderators
As described, the individual-level factors I examined include gender, perceived relationship
quality, personality, and global attachment style for both the target and the perceiver. See Table 4
and Table 5 for a summary of these results. Knowledge of identity is captured by the marginal
effect of perceived identity on actual identity, and likewise, knowledge of reputation is captured
by the marginal effect of perceived reputation on actual reputation. Marginal effects are reported
for each group when testing gender (a categorical variable) and for low and high levels (1 standard
deviation below and above the mean, respectively) when testing relationship quality, personality,
and attachment (continuous variables). (The full results for each interaction I ran are available in
the Supplemental Material.) I describe these findings below, one potential moderator at a time, first
with regard to knowledge of identity for both target and perceiver factors and then with regard to
knowledge of reputation.
Gender. First, I examined the extent to which knowledge of identity depends on target and
perceiver gender. I found that identity accuracy and insight are stronger for female targets and
female perceivers than male targets and male perceivers – although friends of both female and
male targets, as well as both female and male perceivers, achieve significant levels of identity
accuracy and insight (see Table 4). I also found that both target and perceiver gender moderate
target-perceiver agreement in the same way. In other words, friends achieve greater levels of
identity accuracy and insight when perceiving a female target and when they are female, and the
extent to which friends agree with targets’ self-views is also greater when the target or the perceiver
is female rather than male.
I then examined the extent to which knowledge of reputation depends on target and perceiver
gender and found different results (see Table 4). Reputation accuracy and insight are stronger
for male targets than female targets – although friends of both male and female targets achieve
significant levels of reputation accuracy and insight. Perceiver gender does not moderate reputation
accuracy or insight. The results also indicated that neither target nor perceiver gender moderate
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Individual-Level Moderators of Knowledge of Others’ Perceptions

Table 4

informant-perceiver agreement. Altogether, friends achieve greater knowledge of reputation when
perceiving a male target, whereas knowledge of reputation does not depend on a perceiver’s own
gender, and the extent to which friends agree with others’ views of targets does not depend on the
gender of either the target or the perceiver.
Perceived relationship quality. Second, I explored whether target- and perceiver-reports of
relationship quality moderate knowledge of others’ perceptions (see Table 4 for these results).
Starting with knowledge of identity, I found that friends of targets who reported higher relationship
quality tend to have greater identity accuracy and insight than friends of targets who reported
lower relationship quality. I found similar positive effects of target-reported relationship quality
when examining target-perceiver agreement. In other words, identity accuracy, identity insight,
and agreement between perceivers and targets all tend to be greater when targets experience
higher (rather than lower) relationship quality; in contrast, no moderation effects emerged for
perceiver-reported relationship quality (with the exception of a marginally statistically significant
positive effect on target-perceiver agreement).
I then found that only perceiver-(not target-)reported relationship quality moderates knowledge
of reputation; specifically, perceivers who experience higher relationship quality tend to achieve
greater reputation accuracy and insight than their counterparts who experience lower relationship
quality. See Figure 3 for an illustration of this effect on reputation accuracy. Neither target- nor
perceiver-reported relationship quality moderates informant-perceiver agreement. The correlation
between target-reported and perceiver-reported relationship quality is quite weak (r = .21), which
could help explain the different findings that emerged for target and perceiver factors. Possible
explanations for such discrepancies between target and perceiver relationship experiences and their
impact on knowledge of identity versus reputation are raised in the General Discussion.
Personality traits. Third, I examined the extent to which knowledge of identity is moderated
by personality (see Table 5). Because personality traits were measured using self-reports, I could
not test the effects of target personality on knowledge of identity (see Footnote 11), but found
several significant moderation effects of perceiver personality. Consistent with my expectation, I
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Figure 3. The y-axis reflects reputation accuracy (the marginal effect of a 1 standard deviation increase
in perceived reputation ratings on targets’ actual reputations). As such, this graph represents perceivers’
predicted reputation accuracy depending on perceiver-reported relationship quality.

found that higher perceiver extraversion hinders identity accuracy and insight (see Figure 4 for an
illustration of this effect on identity insight). That is, intraverted perceivers have greater knowledge
of identity than extraverted perceivers. I also found marginally statistically significant effects of
openness such that highly open perceivers achieve greater knowledge of identity, although I did not
expect to find this effect. With regard to target-perceiver agreement, significant results emerged
for perceiver neuroticism and openness such that agreement is higher when perceivers report being
less neurotic and more open.
With respect to personality and knowledge of reputation, consistent with my expectation, the
results indicated that higher target neuroticism hinders reputation accuracy and insight. Contrary
to my expectations, I found that knowledge of reputation does not depend on target extraversion
or agreeableness, and higher levels of target conscientiousness and openness decrease reputation
accuracy and insight. Also contrary to my expectations, neither perceiver extraversion nor openness
moderate knowledge of reputation. The most consistent finding for perceiver personality emerged
for neuroticism such that knowledge of reputation is greater when perceivers report being more
neurotic. The statistically significant results that emerged for agreeableness and conscientiousness
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Figure 4. The y-axis reflects identity insight (the marginal effect of a 1 standard deviation increase in
perceived identity ratings on targets’ actual identities, controlling for perceivers’ own perceptions of targets).
As such, this graph represents perceivers’ predicted identity insight depending on perceiver extraversion.

are somewhat inconsistent across reputation accuracy and insight. Specifically, reputation insight
(but not accuracy) is greater when perceivers report being low in agreeableness, and reputation
accuracy (but not insight) is greater when perceivers report being high in conscientiousness (although
these effects were only marginally statistically significant). See Table 5 for a summary of these
findings. Finally, informant-perceiver agreement appears to be higher when targets are low in
openness and when perceivers are high in neuroticism. Overall, I hesitate to draw inferences about
these results due to the large number of moderation tests; the findings, however, are discussed
below.
Global attachment style. Fourth, I examined the extent to which knowledge of others’ perceptions
depends on global attachment (see Table 4). First, with respect to knowledge of identity, the
results indicated that, as expected, identity accuracy and insight are greater when targets are
low in anxiety- and avoidance-related attachment and when perceivers are high in anxiety-related
attachment. While I expected avoidantly attached perceivers to have less of knowledge of identity,
the results indicated the opposite effect (highly avoidant perceivers achieve greater identity insight
than their more securely attached counterparts, although there was no moderation effect for identity
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Figure 5. The y-axis reflects reputation insight (the marginal effect of a 1 standard deviation increase
in perceived reputation ratings on targets’ actual reputations, controlling for perceivers’ own perceptions
of targets). As such, this graph represents perceivers’ predicted reputation insight depending on target
anxiety-related attachment.

accuracy). With regard to target-perceiver agreement, agreement is higher when targets are low in
anxiety- or avoidance-related attachment, whereas perceiver attachment does not moderate this
association.
I then examined attachment and knowledge of reputation. Consistent with my expectation,
reputation accuracy and insight are greater when targets are high in avoidance-related attachment,
perhaps because perceivers can detect discrepancies in these targets’ behaviors across social and
one-on-one situations. Contrary to my expectation, however, knowledge of reputation is also
greater when targets are low in anxiety-related attachment (see Figure 5 for an illustration of this
effect on reputation insight). No moderation effects emerged for perceiver attachment (with the
exception of a marginally statistically significant effect suggesting that reputation insight is greater
when perceivers are high in anxiety-related attachment). With regard to informant-perceiver agreement,
only one significant effect emerged; specifically, agreement is higher when targets are low in
anxiety-related attachment. Again, due to the large number and exploratory nature of these tests, I
am reluctant to draw inferences about these results.
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Dyad-level Moderators
Finally, I tested whether dyad-level factors moderate knowledge of others’ perceptions. See
Table 6 for a summary of these results (also, see the Supplemental Material for the full results of
each test). This table reports the marginal effects for each group when testing gender composition
(based on categorical variables) and for low and high levels (1 standard deviation below and above
the mean, respectively) when testing relationship duration (a continuous variable).
Gender composition. First, examining gender composition was helpful for better understanding
the individual-level moderation effects of gender that emerged for both types of knowledge of
others’ perceptions. Starting with knowledge of identity, I found that perceivers in same-sex
female dyads achieve greater identity accuracy and identity insight than perceivers in same-sex
male dyads and perceivers in opposite-sex dyads (although perceivers in all three types of dyads
achieve identity accuracy and insight). Perceivers in same-sex female dyads also achieve higher
target-perceiver agreement than perceivers in same-sex male dyads and perceivers in opposite-sex
dyads (although perceivers in all three types of dyads also achieve target-perceiver agreement).
Knowledge of identity and target-perceiver agreement were statistically indistinguishable between
same-sex male and opposite-sex dyads.
With regard to knowledge of reputation, I found that gender composition moderates both
reputation accuracy and insight (but only at a marginally statistically significant level). Specifically,
perceivers in same-sex male dyads achieve greater knowledge of reputation than perceivers in
opposite-sex dyads, although the difference between same-sex male dyads and same-sex female
dyads is not statistically significant. Also, perceivers in all three types of dyads achieve reputation
accuracy and insight (with the exception of perceivers in opposite-sex dyads who do not achieve
reputation insight). Gender composition does not moderate informant-perceiver agreement, indicating
that the extent to which perceivers agree with others about a target’s personality does not depend
on the combination of their own gender and the targets’ gender (perceivers in all three types of
dyads achieve informant-perceiver agreement).
Relationship duration. Lastly, when testing relationship duration as a potential moderator,
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Identity
Insight
Marginal χ 2
Effect
0.22∗
0.19∗
0.31∗
0.70
6.58∗
19.06∗
0.25∗
0.30∗
3.61†

Reputation
Accuracy
Marginal χ 2
Effect
0.35∗
0.47∗
0.41∗
3.18†
1.26
1.44
0.42∗
0.43∗
0.00

Reputation
Insight
Marginal χ 2
Effect
0.05
0.17∗
0.11∗
3.21†
0.96
1.93
0.11∗
0.12∗
0.12

Note. Table reports the marginal effects for each group for categorical variables and for low and high levels (1 standard deviation below
and above the mean, respectively) for continuous variables. Table also reports the chi-square significance tests for each comparison. For
all values, * p < .05, † p < .10 (two-tailed test).

Opposite-Sex Dyad
Same-Sex Male Dyad
Same-Sex Female Dyad
Opposite-Sex Dyad vs. Same-Sex Male Dyad
Opposite-Sex Dyad vs. Same-Sex Female Dyad
Same-Sex Male Dyad vs. Same-Sex Female Dyad
Low Relationship Duration
High Relationship Duration
Low vs. High Relationship Duration

Identity
Accuracy
Marginal χ 2
Effect
0.35∗
0.31∗
0.45∗
0.71
7.24∗
20.57∗
0.38∗
0.43∗
4.59∗

Dyad-Level Moderators of Knowledge of Others’ Perceptions

Table 6
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Figure 6. The y-axis reflects identity accuracy (the marginal effect of a 1 standard deviation increase in
perceived identity ratings on targets’ actual identities). As such, this graph represents perceivers’ predicted
identity accuracy depending on relationship duration (how long the target and perceiver have known each
other).

I found that perceivers who have known targets for a longer (rather than shorter) duration tend
to achieve greater identity accuracy and insight (although the effect on insight only reaches a
marginally statistically significant level), as well as higher target-perceiver agreement (see Figure
6 for an illustration of the effect of duration on identity accuracy). In contrast, relationship
duration does not moderate knowledge of reputation or informant-perceiver agreement. Altogether,
knowledge of how a target sees himself and agreement with a target’s self-views both depend on
relationship duration, whereas knowledge of how others see a target and agreement with others’
views of a target do not depend on relationship duration.
General Discussion
Although egocentrism – seeing the world only from one’s own perspective – was initially
thought of as a component of childlike thinking (Piaget, Gabain, & Gabain, 1959), adults continue
to make egocentrically biased judgments throughout their everyday lives (e.g., Holmes, 1968;
Krueger & Clement, 1994; Ross et al., 1977). Perhaps motivated by the desire to have successful
social interactions (Mead, 1934), adults are able to correct their egocentric interpretations of the
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world (Epley et al., 2004) and understand that others may have discrepant points of view (e.g.,
people understand that others do not perceive them exactly as they see themselves (Carlson, Vazire,
& Furr, 2011) and differ in terms of how much they like another person (Kenny et al., 1996)).
Building on these insights, the current study provides further evidence that people can overcome
their egocentric tendencies: well-acquainted friends have the meta-cognitive ability to understand
that others’ perceptions of a target’s personality may differ from their own and even appropriately
correct for such differences when inferring others’ perceptions.
To summarize the results from the current study, I found that, in addition to target-perceiver
agreement and informant-perceiver agreement (both of which are based on the more traditional
approach used to assess other-knowledge), well-acquainted friends achieve two types of pragmatic
other-knowledge. Specifically, using both the profile-based and trait-based approach, I found that
friends have accurate perceptions of targets’ self-views and others’ views of targets (i.e., identity
and reputation accuracy). In addition, even after controlling for friends’ own perceptions of
targets, friends are able to predict targets’ self-views (i.e., identity insight) using both analytical
approaches. However, again when controlling for friends’ own perceptions, friends are only
able to predict targets’ reputations (i.e., reputation insight) at the idiographic (profile) level of
analysis, with the exception of achieving reputation insight for the trait of conscientiousness when
using the trait-based approach. At a glance, informant-perceiver agreement appears to be higher
than target-perceiver agreement for extraversion, agreeableness, neuroticism, and openness, which
suggests that it may be more difficult to achieve insight into reputation than identity because
perceivers seem to agree more with others’ than targets’ views. Put another way, there are less
discrepant perceptions among perceivers and informants and, thus, fewer opportunities for perceivers
to detect differences between others’ views and their own. Moreover, the reputation insight finding
that emerged with the profile-based approach may have been driven by a single trait (conscientiousness).
This possibility highlights the importance of taking multiple approaches when analyzing data,
especially for novel constructs.
While identity and reputation accuracy cannot distinguish between knowledge of others’ perceptions
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at a conscious level and assumed agreement (or similarity), identity and reputation insight are
especially valuable constructs because they provide evidence that even people who are well-acquainted
can see beyond their own perceptions of one another. Research suggests that people inherently have
blind spots about alternative perspectives even when they are motivated to be fair and accurate, but
when they are explicitly presented with an opportunity to see someone in a different light, as in the
current study, people are more likely to consider other possibilities (Lord et al., 1984). For instance,
Lord and colleagues’ (1984) “consider the opposite” technique involves actively contemplating
alternative, discrepant points of view in the face of a preexisting perception. It is unclear from the
current analyses whether people typically juggle multiple perceptions of a target in addition to their
own or only contemplate alternative views when prompted to do so. Either way, achieving insight
into others’ perceptions could lead people to reflect on the accuracy of their own and others’ views,
and ultimately to knowledge of self- and other-biases. Potentially, continuing this line of research
may clarify whether achieving knowledge of others’ perceptions is an effective debiasing strategy
or perhaps just a tactful way to claim knowing better than others.
Theoretically, acquiring knowledge of others’ perceptions has pragmatic value. First, knowing
how people perceive themselves can be important for predicting their behaviors in certain situations
or for motivating them in ways that could be beneficial for a group (or, more selfishly, for oneself).
For instance, being able to put aside one’s own views of an employee and seeing him as he sees
himself could result in assigning that employee to tasks that would boost his self-confidence in the
workplace. Second, knowing how people are perceived by others may be important for a perceiver
in terms of re-examining his own views or knowing when to smooth over social situations. For
instance, being aware that others have less positive views of one’s spouse may lead an individual
to make decisions that preemptively protect his spouse’s feelings. Thus, simultaneously juggling
multiple perspectives could be quite advantageous in navigating through one’s social arena from
day to day, regardless of the desire to get ahead or get along.
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Knowledge of Others’ Perceptions May Be Enhanced
I also found that knowledge of others’ perceptions depends on characteristics of the individuals
within the friendship and the friendship itself.
Gender and gender composition. With respect to gender factors, knowledge of identity (both
accuracy and insight) is greater when the target is female, when the perceiver is female, and when
the dyad is comprised of two females. Similar to the traditional accuracy findings in the literature
(e.g., Chan et al., 2011; Vogt & Colvin, 2003), these results indicate that women tend to be better
targets and better judges than men with regard to knowledge of identity; specifically, females’
self-perceptions are easier to detect and female perceivers are more likely to accurately infer how
targets see themselves, respectively. It is particularly impressive that female perceivers are able to
achieve knowledge of identity given that, compared to males, they also have especially high levels
of agreement with targets about the targets’ personalities (target-perceiver agreement b = .42 and
b = .31 for females versus males, respectively, and this difference is statistically significant, χ 2 =
18.16, p < .05).
In contrast, knowledge of reputation (both accuracy and insight) is greater when the target is
male and, to an extent, when the dyad is comprised of two males. Whereas it was not particularly
surprising that females do a better job of understanding their friends’ self-views (based on the
what is currently known about gender and the accuracy of other-perceptions; Chan et al., 2011),
the finding that perceivers seem to do a better job of accurately monitoring others’ perceptions of
their friends when their friends are male is quite novel. At this point, it is unclear why this gender
differential exists. However, in a dating context, one study found that it is easier for a third person
to judge the romantic interest of males than females (Place et al., 2009). Place and colleagues
(2009) suggest that this may be associated with a biological need for women to be more covert
and deceptive in their true romantic intentions whereas it is less risky for men to express their
true interests. Although the authors assessed knowledge of another person’s romantic interest,
their finding could be relevant for the current results – in both studies perceivers were asked to
guess what other people think of another person. Given that most targets in the current study
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nominated same-sex informants, male targets (whose reputations were more accurately judged
than female targets) had reputation measures mostly comprised of other males’ perceptions. Thus,
it is plausible that inferring a male target’s reputation is easier because, like Place and colleagues’
(2009) findings, male friends are more willing to be overt in their opinions of another person when
in front of outsiders, whereas female friends may be inhibited or worry about the consequences of
transparency.
Individual differences. The results indicated that knowledge of others’ perceptions may depend
on target and perceiver personality traits and attachment orientation, but due to the exploratory
nature and large number of moderation tests conducted, I hesitate to make inferences about these
findings without replication. Moreover, the current moderation analyses were limited to only using
a profile-based approach, but findings from a trait-based approach could indicate that achieving
knowledge of others’ perceptions depends more on individual Big Five traits and global attachment
style than my findings suggest, at least for individual differences associated with the perceiver. That
is, it may be the case that a “takes one to know one” or a “takes one to know who’s not one” model
could influence knowledge of others’ perceptions by using oneself as a baseline for comparison.
For example, it is possible that if Paul is especially neurotic, he will be more attentive to how Tim
sees himself and how others see Tim on this particular trait.
Interestingly, a distinction has been made between having perspective-taking ability and using
this ability (Keysar, Lin, & Barr, 2003; Wu & Keysar, 2007), and it is possible that other characteristics
beyond individual differences may also moderate knowledge of others’ perceptions of personality.
Indeed, Wu and Keysar (2007) found that Chinese and Americans can both distinguish between
their perspectives and others’, yet Chinese are better when it comes to actually taking others’
perspectives and utilizing that information. Likewise, cultural differences and contextual factors
may also contribute to the understanding of what moderates knowledge of identity and reputation.
Relationship factors. With respect to relationship quality, I found that target-reported quality
seems to be important for achieving knowledge of identity whereas knowledge of reputation depends
on perceiver-reported quality. Although I cannot infer causal direction, it is plausible that targets
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who are happier with the friendship disclose more (or targets who reveal more about themselves
become happier with the friendship), thereby enhancing the extent to which perceivers know how
targets see themselves. Interestingly, perceivers who are happier with the friendship do not seem
to obtain more information from targets than perceivers who are less happy with the friendship,
indicating that the ability to achieve knowledge of identity is driven primarily by the target’s
experience within the friendship.
Rather than probing targets directly for more information about themselves, perceivers who
experience higher quality friendships may seek and attend to cues from others about how they see
the target, resulting in greater knowledge of reputation. Perhaps this is a way to gauge the accuracy
of their own perceptions of the target (e.g., misjudging someone’s personality could lead to betrayal
or deception), whereas perceivers who experience lower quality friendships are more apathetic and
less likely to detect and utilize relevant information from others. I was somewhat surprised by
the weak correlation between target- and perceiver-reported relationship quality (r = .21), however
previous research has demonstrated that, indeed, friendships are not always reciprocal (Vaquera
& Kao, 2008). Some targets in the current study may have been overly positive when assessing
the quality of their friendship because they explicitly nominated this person as their “best” friend;
in contrast, some of the friends who were nominated may not have viewed the targets as their
reciprocal best friends and were less motivated to rate their friendship in the same overly positive
manner.
Finally, I found that relationship duration moderates identity accuracy and has a marginally
statistically significant effect on identity insight. These results are somewhat consistent with the
traditional accuracy literature, which is mixed (some studies find that accuracy increases with
duration (Biesanz et al., 2007; Blackman & Funder, 1998) and others do not (Kenny, 2004; Watson
et al., 2000)). It is plausible that duration would have a stronger effect on identity insight and
knowledge of reputation if participants had not been limited to nominating only best friends who
lived locally. Because the current participants were undergraduates and many of their long-term,
hometown best friends probably attended other universities in different cities, their local best
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friends knew the targets for a relatively short period of time. Indeed, whereas the best friends in
the current analyses knew targets for an average of 2.4 years, the hometown friends also nominated
by targets knew the targets for an average of 8.2 years.
Limitations and Future Directions
The results I have reported are encouraging with regard to better understanding what people
know beyond their own perceptions of others and when they are more likely to achieve knowledge
of others’ perceptions. Building off of previous research on the accuracy of other-perceptions,
meta-cognitive skills associated with self-knowledge, and pragmatic accuracy, the current study
may contribute to what is known about pragmatic other-knowledge among well-acquainted individuals.
Nonetheless, there are several aspects of this study that could be improved upon.
First, the primary analyses were limited to include only global (Big Five) personality traits.
Examining a broader range of individual differences that vary in evaluativeness and valence would
provide more information about the extent to which and under what conditions people are likely
to achieve knowledge of identity and reputation. Given that higher agreement tends to occur for
the Big Five traits than other individual differences (e.g., John & Robins, 1993), it is possible
that greater discrepancies in perceptions of characteristics, such as “arrogant” and “likeable,” are
associated with increased ability to detect such differences – and thus, greater knowledge of others’
perceptions.
Second, the current operationalization of reputation might have affected the knowledge of
reputation results. Again, because targets could only nominate local best friends, these perceivers
may have had a substantial disadvantage when inferring others’ perceptions of the targets if targets’
general informants tended to be hometown friends who the local best friends never met. It is
currently unclear whether perceivers had exposure to the individuals whose perceptions comprised
the reputation measure. Relatedly, future studies should disentangle the extent to which perceivers’
knowledge of reputation is driven by differential or stereotypical accuracy; that is, do perceivers
know how others see targets because they are speculating about specific others or because they
generally expect others to apply certain stereotypes to the targets? In addition, the reputation
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measure was an aggregate of anywhere from one to five informants’ perceptions, which meant
that some targets had more reliable reputation measures than others, which could influence the
likelihood of accurate inferences about others’ perceptions.
Third, my measure of the Big Five may be problematic for making inferences about the extent
to which target and perceiver personality moderate knowledge of others’ perceptions in multiple
ways. Most notably, personality was assessed using self-reports as opposed to an aggregate of selfand other-reports or an alternative, more objective measure. Thus, at best, the various significant
moderation effects that emerged could only suggest that knowledge of others’ perceptions depends
on self-perceptions of personality, not personality itself.
Also, on the one hand, it is possible that the moderation findings for target and perceiver
personality are not valid, based on the below adequate alpha reliabilities of the Big Five scale
scores (with the exception of extraversion; see Footnote 5). Previous research has demonstrated
that shorter measures of the Big Five, such as the Ten-Item Personality Inventory (TIPI; Gosling,
Rentfrow, & Swann, 2003), are considered to be less reliable and correlate less strongly with other
variables. Moreover, unlike the TIPI, the psychometric properties of the two-item personality
measure used in the current study is not established. Thus, it is plausible that a) using the full
44-item BFI or other multi-item measures of the Big Five or b) using a well-validated shorter
measure such as the TIPI, would alter the extent to which my findings indicate that knowledge
of others’ perceptions depends on target and perceiver personality. On the other hand, shorter
measures do reach adequate levels of convergent and discriminant validity, test-retest reliability,
and patterns of external correlates (Gosling et al., 2003), and thus it is also possible that the current
findings based on a subset of the BFI (the BFI itself being exceptionally well-validated) capture
some degree of truth. Importantly, replication using a more psychometrically sound measure of
the Big Five will contribute to what is actually known about the moderating effects of personality
on this type of other-knowledge. Nonetheless, the primary findings related to knowledge of
identity and reputation were not affected by the low alpha reliabilities, as they reflect knowledge
of perceptions of personality rather than the predictive validity of personality itself.
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Lastly, the validity of the moderation analyses could be improved in three additional ways.
With regard to gender factors, a sample comprised more equally of men and women would help
in bolstering the moderation results related to gender and gender composition. The subsamples
used are unbalanced and having a larger sample of males and same-sex male dyads would provide
smaller confidence intervals and more precise estimates of the moderation effects. Next, in terms
of individual differences, previous research has demonstrated that other individual differences that
are even broader than the Big Five personality traits and attachment style, such as psychological
adjustment, also influence accuracy in the traditional sense (e.g., Human & Biesanz, 2011a, 2011b).
Thus, it may be worth examining whether achieving knowledge of others’ perceptions depends
more so on broad psychological constructs such as adjustment and well-being and pervasive characteristics
such as narcissism (e.g., narcissists know how others’ perceptions differ from their own self-views;
Carlson, Vazire, & Oltmanns, 2011) relative to the Big Five and attachment orientation. Finally,
regarding relationship factors, it is possible that I limited my ability to detect conditional effects
of duration on knowledge of others’ perceptions by constraining who targets could nominate as
their best friends. That is, because it was specified that best friends must live locally, the range of
variation in the relationship duration variable was significantly restricted (consequently, the null
moderation effect of duration for knowledge of reputation may have been affected by a reduced
correlation).15
In addition to improving upon some of the issues I have discussed, another important future
direction related to this research involves explicitly studying outcomes associated with achieving
knowledge of others’ perceptions. Presumably, having this type of other-knowledge will enable
people to influence their own or others’ behaviors and social situations. Previous research has
shown that perspective-taking impacts behaviors in both competitive and cooperative environments
(Epley, Caruso, & Bazerman, 2006). Also, perspective-taking is positively associated with creativity
(Grant et al., 2011), improvement in romantic relationship functioning (Arriaga & Rusbult, 1998),
15

For instance, in a separate study, using a different sample of respondents from the same undergraduate
population, participants were asked to nominate their best friends with no constraints, which they reported knowing
for approximately 5.2 years (as compared to the 2.4 years duration in the current analyses).
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and decreases in outgroup bias (Galinsky & Ku, 2004). Similarly, knowledge of identity and
reputation of personality traits may be associated with goal-oriented behaviors that promote more
successful social transactions, regardless of self- vs. other-focused psychological motives. As
such, I believe that an important extension of the present model is to examine how and when such
pragmatic knowledge leads to positive interpersonal outcomes (e.g., cooperation and less conflict)
in both personal and professional contexts.
Finally, beyond this study, little is known about the meta-cognitive processes that are associated
with understanding others’ perceptions of personality. Unlike empathic accuracy, in which a
perceiver cannot dispute what a target was actually thinking or feeling, a perceiver can disagree
with a target and others about a target’s actual personality. It is unclear, however, whether people
tend to believe that they are accurate (and thus others are biased) when they report that their own
views of a target are different from a target’s identity and reputation. Understanding whether
people think that they are accurate or admit that they are biased in relation to others is an important
component of understanding the meta-cognitive mechanisms (e.g., epistemic vigilance (Sperber
et al., 2010) and considering-the-opposite (Lord et al., 1984)) that underlie knowledge of others’
perceptions and awareness of bias in self- and other-perceptions of personality. As I have demonstrated,
people may be inextricably egocentric and aware: they knowingly maintain their discrepant perceptions,
even after weighing the validity of alternative views against their own.
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Appendix A
Full Equations for the Knowledge of Others’ Perceptions (KOP) Model
T Iijk = β0ij + β1ij P Iijk + β2ij P Otherijk + ijk

(1)

β0ij = β00 + µ0i + µ0j

(2)

β1ij = β10 + β11 M odijl + µ1i + µ1j

(3)

These equations specify the model used for knowledge of identity. Because the equations for
examining identity insight using the profile-based approach are the most complex, I detail them
here and conclude with a description for how to adapt the model to examine identity accuracy,
reputation accuracy, and reputation insight, as well as how to apply the trait-based approach for
assessing each type of knowledge.
In the model above, T Iijk (the dependent variable) corresponds to the distinctive identity
(self-perception) of Target i in Dyad j on item k after grand mean centering within item (centered
validity measures produce estimates that are easier to interpret; ?, ?). The intercept is represented
by β0ij . P Iijk represents the perceived identity rating of Target i in Dyad j on item k (reported
by Target i’s perceiver). β1ij is the regression coefficient for the distinctive identity insight slope:
the relationship between the perceived identity rating of Target i in Dyad j on item k and Target
i in Dyad j’s distinctive identity measure on the same item k, with the normative profile (i.e., the
mean target self-perception for item k) partialled out. P Otherijk represents the other-perception
(the perceiver’s own perception) of Target i in Dyad j on item k. β2ijk is the regression coefficient
for the target-perceiver agreement slope: the relationship between the perceiver’s own perception
of Target i in Dyad j on item k and the distinctive identity of Target i in Dyad j on the same
item k, with the normative profile (i.e., the mean target self-perception for item k) partialled out.
The intercept is allowed to vary across dyads and items. β00 reflects the average levels (i.e., fixed
effects) of distinctive target identity. I allowed the slope for P Iijk to vary randomly by item. β10
reflects the average level of distinctive identity insight holding the group level predictor constant
at its mean. I had no theory to support allowing the slopes for P Iijk to vary randomly by dyad, and
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given that I examine dyad effects in the analyses of dyad-level moderators, I report the results for
the more parsimonious models (i.e., varying slopes by item only).
To examine potential individual-level moderators (e.g., target gender and perceiver gender),
individual-level variable l is entered as a moderator of the identity insight slope. In equation
3, M odijl is Target i in Dyad j’s score on moderator l (which could reflect characteristics of the
target or the perceiver). In equation 3, β11 is the regression coefficient for individual-level variable l
moderating distinctive identity insight. A positive interaction between variable l and the perceived
identity rating of Target i predicting Target i’s distinctive identity (or a positive value for β11 )
would indicate that individuals higher in variable l are more likely to achieve distinctive identity
insight. Because variable l reflects a characteristic of either the target or the perceiver, a positive
value for β11 would indicate that either (a) targets higher in variable l are more likely to facilitate
distinctive identity insight for the perceiver or (b) perceivers higher in variable l are more likely to
achieve distinctive identity insight. In equation 3, µ1i reflects target-perceiver random effects for
distinctive identity insight main effects averaged across targets. µ1j reflects dyad random effects
for distinctive identity insight main effects averaged across targets. A similar approach was used to
examine dyad-level moderators (e.g., relationship duration) of distinctive identity insight. Rather
than entering an individual-level factor l as a moderator of the identity insight slope, these variables
were replaced with dyad-level factors and the models estimated between-dyad effects.
To adapt the KOP model for assessing accuracy (rather than insight), I simply excluded the
component controlling for perceivers’ own perceptions of targets (P Otherijk ) from equation 1.
To adapt the KOP model for assessing knowledge of reputation, I replaced the dependent variable
T Iijk with T Rijk (reflecting targets’ actual reputations with the normative reputation profile partialled
out). Then, I replaced β1ij P Iijk with β1ij P Rijk (reflecting perceivers’ perceived reputation ratings).
The models for examining knowledge of others’ perceptions using the trait-based approach are the
same as the models described using the profile-based approach except that the variation in item k
is not accounted for because knowledge of others’ perceptions are examined one trait at a time.
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Appendix B
Perceived Relationship Quality Items
Each of the following items were assessed on 7-point Likert-type scales.
1. How close (in terms of your relationship) are you to this person? (1 = Not at all close, 7 =
Extremely close)
2. How important is your relationship with this person? (1 = Not at all important, 7 = Extremely
important)
3. How would you rate the quality of your relationship with this person? (1 = Not good, 7 =
Extremely good)
4. How much do you like this person? (1 = Not at all, 7 = Very much)
5. How satisfied are you with your relationship with this person? (1 = Not at all satisfied, 7 =
Extremely satisfied)
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Supplemental Material

The remainder of this document includes all of the supplemental material referenced in the main
text.
The alpha reliabilities for each primary measure for each Big Five trait are listed below.
Extraversion
Primary participant/best friend reported Identity: .78/.83
Primary participant/best friend reported Other-perception: .82/.77
Primary participant/best friend reported Perceived Identity: .80/.78
General Informant reported Reputation: .78
Best friend reported Perceived Reputation: .84
Agreeableness
Primary participant/best friend reported Identity: .57/.58
Primary participant/best friend reported Other-perception: .71/.74
Primary participant/best friend reported Perceived Identity: .71/.66
General Informant reported Reputation: .75
Best friend reported Perceived Reputation: .79
Conscientiousness
Primary participant/best friend reported Identity: .63/.54
Primary participant/best friend reported Other-perception: .63/.64
Primary participant/best friend reported Perceived Identity: .52/ .51
General Informant reported Reputation: .63
Best friend reported Perceived Reputation: .75
Neuroticism
Primary participant/best friend reported Identity: .69/.67
Primary participant/best friend reported Other-perception: .72/.68
Primary participant/best friend reported Perceived Identity: .69/.70
General Informant reported Reputation: .71
Best friend reported Perceived Reputation: .75
Openness
Primary participant/best friend reported Identity: .62/.70
Primary participant/best friend reported Other-perception: .62/.66
Primary participant/best friend reported Perceived Identity: .53/.65
General Informant reported Reputation: .65
Best friend reported Perceived Reputation: .70
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Table SM-1 Correlation Matrices
Extraversion
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Identity
Other-perception
Perceived identity
Reputation
Perceived reputation

(1)
1.00
.62∗
.63∗
.66∗
.59∗

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

1.00
.84∗
.61∗
.94∗

1.00
.58∗
.81∗

1.00
.60∗

1.00

(1)
1.00
.41∗
.41∗
.34∗
.38∗

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

1.00
.65∗
.41∗
.88∗

1.00
.31∗
.61∗

1.00
.38∗

1.00

(1)
1.00
.33∗
.42∗
.34∗
.35∗

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

1.00
.81∗
.43∗
.89∗

1.00
.40∗
.78∗

1.00
.45∗

1.00

(1)
1.00
.50∗
.53∗
.56∗
.42∗

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

1.00
.79∗
.49∗
.80∗

1.00
.46∗
.63∗

1.00
.34∗

1.00

(1)
1.00
.31∗
.34∗
.24∗
.30∗

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

1.00
.85∗
.31∗
.81∗

1.00
.25∗
.76∗

1.00
.27∗

1.00

Agreeableness
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Identity
Other-perception
Perceived identity
Reputation
Perceived reputation

Conscientiousness
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Identity
Other-perception
Perceived identity
Reputation
Perceived reputation

Neuroticism
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Identity
Other-perception
Perceived identity
Reputation
Perceived reputation

Openness
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Identity
Other-perception
Perceived identity
Reputation
Perceived reputation

Note. For all correlation matrices, ∗ denotes p < .05 (two-tailed test).
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Table SM-2
Results of Moderation Analyses for Identity Accuracy Using Individual-Level Factors
Perceived Identity
Target Gender
Perceiver Gender
Target Quality
Perceiver Quality
Target Anxiety
Target Avoidance
Perceiver Anxiety
Perceiver Avoidance
Perceived Identity × Target Gender
Perceived Identity × Perceiver Gender
Perceived Identity × Target Quality
Perceived Identity × Perceiver Quality
Perceived Identity × Target Anxiety
Perceived Identity × Target Avoidance
Perceived Identity × Perceiver Anxiety
Perceived Identity × Perceiver Avoidance

0.32∗ 0.32∗ 0.46∗ 0.47∗ 0.41∗ 0.41∗ 0.41∗ 0.41∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
0.15∗
(0.04)
0.09∗
(0.04)
0.11∗
(0.03)
−0.02
(0.03)
−0.06∗
(0.01)
−0.12∗
(0.01)
0.05∗
(0.01)
0.02
(0.01)
0.12∗
(0.03)
0.11∗
(0.03)
0.05∗
(0.02)
0.01
(0.02)
−0.03∗
(0.01)
−0.04∗
(0.01)
0.02∗
(0.01)
0.02
(0.01)

Note. Table reports the regression coefficients for the independent variables used in the moderation analyses
and for the interaction terms. Standard errors in parentheses. For all values, * p < .05 (two-tailed test).
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Table SM-3
Results of Moderation Analyses for Identity Accuracy Using
Individual-Level Factors (continued)
Perceived Identity
Perceiver Ext
Perceiver Agr
Perceiver Con
Perceiver Neu
Perceiver Ope
Perceived Identity × Perceiver Ext
Perceived Identity × Perceiver Agr
Perceived Identity × Perceiver Con
Perceived Identity × Perceiver Neu
Perceived Identity × Perceiver Ope

0.41∗ 0.41∗ 0.41∗ 0.41∗ 0.40∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
−0.09∗
(0.01)
−0.06∗
(0.01)
−0.03∗
(0.01)
−0.01
(0.01)
−0.08∗
(0.01)
−0.03∗
(0.01)
0.00
(0.01)
−0.01
(0.01)
−0.01
(0.01)
0.02†
(0.01)

Note. Table reports the regression coefficients for the independent variables
used in the moderation analyses and for the interaction terms. Standard
errors in parentheses. Ext = Extraversion, Agr = Agreeableness, Con =
Conscientiousness, Neu = Neuroticism, and Ope = Openness. For all values, *
p < .05, † p < .10 (two-tailed test).
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Table SM-4
Results of Moderation Analyses for Identity Insight Using Individual-Level Factors
Perceived Identity
Other-Perception
Target Gender

0.19∗
(0.04)
0.17∗
(0.03)
0.13∗
(0.04)

0.19∗
(0.04)
0.17∗
(0.03)

0.31∗
(0.04)
0.20∗
(0.03)

0.30∗
(0.04)
0.22∗
(0.03)

0.27∗
(0.03)
0.18∗
(0.03)

0.27∗
(0.03)
0.18∗
(0.02)

0.27∗
(0.03)
0.18∗
(0.03)

0.08∗
(0.04)

Perceiver Gender

0.11∗
(0.03)

Target Quality

−0.05
(0.03)

Perceiver Quality

−0.06∗
(0.01)

Target Anxiety

−0.12∗
(0.01)

Target Avoidance

0.05∗
(0.01)

Perceiver Anxiety

0.02
(0.01)

Perceiver Avoidance
Perceived Identity × Target Gender
Perceived Identity × Perceiver Gender

0.27∗
(0.03)
0.18∗
(0.03)

0.11∗
(0.03)
0.11∗
(0.03)

Perceived Identity × Target Quality

0.05∗
(0.02)

Perceived Identity × Perceiver Quality

−0.01
(0.02)

Perceived Identity × Target Anxiety

−0.03∗
(0.01)

Perceived Identity × Target Avoidance

−0.04∗
(0.01)

Perceived Identity × Perceiver Anxiety

0.03∗
(0.01)

Perceived Identity × Perceiver Avoidance

0.03∗
(0.01)

Note. Table reports the regression coefficients for the independent variables used in the moderation analyses
and for the interaction terms. Standard errors in parentheses. For all values, * p < .05 (two-tailed test).
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Table SM-5
Results of Moderation Analyses
Individual-Level Factors (continued)
Perceived Identity
Other-Perception
Perceiver Ext

for

0.27∗
(0.03)
0.18∗
(0.02)
−0.09∗
(0.01)

Identity

0.27∗
(0.03)
0.18∗
(0.03)

Insight

0.27∗
(0.03)
0.18∗
(0.03)

0.27∗
(0.03)
0.17∗
(0.03)

0.27∗
(0.03)
0.18∗
(0.02)

−0.07∗
(0.01)

Perceiver Agr

−0.03∗
(0.01)

Perceiver Con

−0.01
(0.01)

Perceiver Neu

−0.08∗
(0.01)

Perceiver Ope
Perceived Identity × Perceiver Ext

Using

−0.04∗
(0.01)

Perceived Identity × Perceiver Agr

0.00
(0.01)

Perceived Identity × Perceiver Con

−0.01
(0.01)

Perceived Identity × Perceiver Neu

−0.01
(0.01)

Perceived Identity × Perceiver Ope

0.02†
(0.01)

Note. Table reports the regression coefficients for the independent variables
used in the moderation analyses and for the interaction terms. Standard
errors in parentheses. Ext = Extraversion, Agr = Agreeableness, Con =
Conscientiousness, Neu = Neuroticism, and Ope = Openness. For all values, *
p < .05, † p < .10 (two-tailed test).
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Table SM-6
Results of Moderation Analyses for Reputation Accuracy Using Individual-Level Factors
Perceived Reputation
Target Sex
Perceiver Sex
Target Quality
Perceiver Quality
Target Anxiety
Target Avoidance
Perceiver Anxiety
Perceiver Avoidance
Perceived Reputation × Target Gender
Perceived Reputation × Perceiver Gender
Perceived Reputation × Target Quality
Perceived Reputation × Perceiver Quality
Perceived Reputation × Target Anxiety
Perceived Reputation × Target Avoidance
Perceived Reputation × Perceiver Anxiety
Perceived Reputation × Perceiver Avoidance

0.49∗ 0.41∗ 0.42∗ 0.42∗ 0.41∗ 0.42∗ 0.43∗ 0.42∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
0.17∗
(0.04)
0.14∗
(0.04)
0.03
(0.02)
0.05∗
(0.02)
−0.03
(0.02)
−0.04∗
(0.02)
0.00
(0.02)
−0.05∗
(0.02)
−0.09∗
(0.04)
0.01
(0.04)
0.00
(0.02)
0.05∗
(0.02)
−0.08∗
(0.02)
0.05∗
(0.02)
0.02
(0.02)
−0.01
(0.02)

Note. Table reports the regression coefficients for the independent variables used in the moderation analyses and
for the interaction terms. Standard errors in parentheses. For all values, * p < .05 (two-tailed test).
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Table SM-7
Results of Moderation Analyses for Reputation Accuracy Using Individual-Level Factors (continued)
Perceived Reputation
Target Ext
Target Agr
Target Con
Target Neu
Target Ope
Perceiver Ext
Perceiver Agr
Perceiver Con
Perceiver Neu
Perceiver Ope
Perceived Reputation × Target Ext
Perceived Reputation × Target Agr
Perceived Reputation × Target Con
Perceived Reputation × Target Neu
Perceived Reputation × Target Ope
Perceived Reputation × Perceiver Ext
Perceived Reputation × Perceiver Agr
Perceived Reputation × Perceiver Con
Perceived Reputation × Perceiver Neu
Perceived Reputation × Perceiver Ope

0.41∗ 0.41∗ 0.42∗ 0.42∗ 0.42∗ 0.42∗ 0.42∗ 0.42∗ 0.43∗ 0.43∗
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
0.10∗
(0.02)
0.06∗
(0.02)
0.01
(0.02)
0.07∗
(0.02)
0.02
(0.02)
0.05∗
(0.02)
0.04∗
(0.02)
0.02
(0.02)
−0.01
(0.02)
−0.02
(0.02)
0.00
(0.02)
0.02
(0.02)
−0.04∗
(0.02)
−0.06∗
(0.02)
−0.07∗
(0.02)
0.02
(0.02)
−0.02
(0.02)
0.03†
(0.02)
0.03†
(0.02)
0.00
(0.02)

Note. Table reports the regression coefficients for the independent variables used in the moderation analyses and for the
interaction terms. Standard errors in parentheses. Ext = Extraversion, Agr = Agreeableness, Con = Conscientiousness, Neu
= Neuroticism, and Ope = Openness. For all values, * p < .05, † p < .10 (two-tailed test).
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Table SM-8
Results of Moderation Analyses for Reputation Insight Using Individual-Level Factors
Perceived Reputation
Other-Perception
Target Sex

0.19∗
(0.05)
0.34∗
(0.05)
0.15∗
(0.04)

0.11∗
(0.05)
0.34∗
(0.05)

0.11∗
(0.04)
0.35∗
(0.05)

0.12∗
(0.04)
0.33∗
(0.05)

0.09∗
(0.04)
0.36∗
(0.05)

0.10∗
(0.04)
0.36∗
(0.05)

0.11∗
(0.04)
0.35∗
(0.05)

0.12∗
(0.04)

Perceiver Sex

0.03
(0.02)

Target Quality

0.03
(0.02)

Perceiver Quality

−0.04∗
(0.02)

Target Anxiety

−0.04∗
(0.02)

Target Avoidance

0.01
(0.02)

Perceiver Anxiety

−0.03
(0.02)

Perceiver Avoidance
Perceived Reputation × Target Gender
Perceived Reputation × Perceiver Gender

0.12∗
(0.04)
0.34∗
(0.05)

−0.09∗
(0.04)
0.00
(0.04)

Perceived Reputation × Target Quality

−0.01
(0.02)

Perceived Reputation × Perceiver Quality

0.04∗
(0.02)

Perceived Reputation × Target Anxiety

−0.07∗
(0.02)

Perceived Reputation × Target Avoidance

0.06∗
(0.02)

Perceived Reputation × Perceiver Anxiety

0.03
(0.02)

Perceived Reputation × Perceiver Avoidance

0.01
(0.02)

Note. Table reports the regression coefficients for the independent variables used in the moderation analyses and
for the interaction terms. Standard errors in parentheses. For all values, * p < .05 (two-tailed test).
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Table SM-9
Results of Moderation Analyses for Reputation Insight Using Individual-Level Factors (continued)
Perceived Reputation
Other-Perception
Target Ext

0.09∗
(0.04)
0.36∗
(0.04)
0.10∗
(0.02)

0.10∗
(0.04)
0.35∗
(0.05)

0.10∗
(0.04)
0.36∗
(0.05)

0.11∗
(0.04)
0.34∗
(0.05)

0.10∗
(0.04)
0.35∗
(0.05)

0.12∗
(0.04)
0.34∗
(0.05)

0.11∗
(0.04)
0.35∗
(0.05)

0.12∗
(0.04)
0.34∗
(0.05)

0.12∗
(0.04)
0.35∗
(0.05)

0.06∗
(0.02)

Target Agr

0.02
(0.02)

Target Con

0.05∗
(0.02)

Target Neu

0.01
(0.02)

Target Ope

0.05∗
(0.02)

Perceiver Ext

0.04∗
(0.02)

Perceiver Agr

0.02
(0.02)

Perceiver Con

−0.01
(0.02)

Perceiver Neu

−0.02
(0.02)

Perceiver Ope
Perceived Reputation × Target Ext
Perceived Reputation × Target Agr
Perceived Reputation × Target Con

0.12∗
(0.04)
0.35∗
(0.05)

0.00
(0.02)
0.01
(0.02)
−0.05∗
(0.02)

Perceived Reputation × Target Neu

−0.04∗
(0.02)

Perceived Reputation × Target Ope

−0.07∗
(0.02)

Perceived Reputation × Perceiver Ext

0.02
(0.02)

Perceived Reputation × Perceiver Agr

−0.03†
(0.02)

Perceived Reputation × Perceiver Con

0.02
(0.02)

Perceived Reputation × Perceiver Neu

0.05∗
(0.02)

Perceived Reputation × Perceiver Ope

0.00
(0.02)

Note. Table reports the regression coefficients for the independent variables used in the moderation analyses and for the
interaction terms. Standard errors in parentheses. Ext = Extraversion, Agr = Agreeableness, Con = Conscientiousness, Neu
= Neuroticism, and Ope = Openness. For all values, * p < .05, † p < .10 (two-tailed test).
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Table SM-10
Results of Moderation Analyses for Identity Accuracy Using
Dyad-Level Factors
Perceived Identity
Opposite-sex Dyad
Same-sex Female Dyad
Duration
Perceived Identity × Opposite-sex Dyad
Perceived Identity × Same-sex Female Dyad
Perceived Identity × Duration

0.31∗ 0.41∗
(0.04) (0.03)
0.11
(0.06)
0.17∗
(0.04)
0.01
(0.02)
0.04
(0.04)
0.13∗
(0.03)
0.02∗
(0.01)

Note. Table reports the regression coefficients for the independent
variables used in the moderation analyses and for the interaction
terms. Standard errors in parentheses. For all values, * p < .05
(two-tailed test).

Table SM-11
Results of Moderation Analyses for Identity Insight Using
Dyad-Level Factors
0.19∗
(0.04)
0.17∗
(0.03)
0.09
(0.06)
0.16∗
(0.04)

Perceived Identity
Other-Perception
Opposite-sex Dyad
Same-sex Female Dyad

0.27∗
(0.03)
0.17∗
(0.03)

0.01
(0.02)

Duration
Perceived Identity × Opposite-sex Dyad
Perceived Identity × Same-sex Female Dyad
Perceived Identity × Duration

0.03
(0.04)
0.13∗
(0.03)
0.02
(0.01)

Note. Table reports the regression coefficients for the independent
variables used in the moderation analyses and for the interaction
terms. Standard errors in parentheses. For all values, * p < .05
(two-tailed test).
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Table SM-12
Results of Moderation Analyses for Reputation Accuracy
Using Dyad-Level Factors
Perceived Reputation
Opposite-sex Dyad
Same-sex Female Dyad
Duration
Perceived Reputation × Opposite-sex Dyad
Perceived Reputation × Same-sex Female Dyad
Perceived Reputation × Duration

0.47∗ 0.43∗
(0.05) (0.03)
0.13
(0.07)
0.18∗
(0.05)
0.02
(0.02)
−0.12
(0.07)
−0.06
(0.05)
0.00
(0.02)

Note. Table reports the regression coefficients for the independent
variables used in the moderation analyses and for the interaction
terms. Standard errors in parentheses. For all values, * p < .05
(two-tailed test).

Table SM-13
Results of Moderation Analyses for Reputation Insight Using
Dyad-Level Factors
0.17∗
(0.05)
0.34∗
(0.05)
0.09
(0.07)
0.15∗
(0.05)

Perceived Reputation
Other-Perception
Opposite-sex Dyad
Same-sex Female Dyad

0.12∗
(0.04)
0.35∗
(0.05)

0.01
(0.02)

Duration
Perceived Reputation × Opposite-sex Dyad
Perceived Reputation × Same-sex Female Dyad
Perceived Reputation × Duration

−0.12
(0.07)
−0.06
(0.05)
0.01
(0.01)

Note. Table reports the regression coefficients for the independent
variables used in the moderation analyses and for the interaction
terms. Standard errors in parentheses. For all values, * p < .05
(two-tailed test).
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